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THESE lectures on Common Law Pleading by Forest J. Martin, of the Maine Bar, are the work of a practitioner of great ability and 
wide reputation. They have stood the test of thirteen years of law 
school teaching. They have during that time been continually im­
proved and amended, and instead of having lost in that process their 
great merit of comprehensive conciseness they have gained every 
year in value and in excellence.
In memory of her husband, Mrs. Clara J. Martin has dedicated 
these lectures to the University of Maine College of Law so that they 
may be:
A souvenir of her husband and of the past to the alumni of the 
School.
A benefit to the students of Common Law Pleading at the 
present time, and
An aid in the practice of the law to future generations of lawyers 
everywhere.
The value of these lectures, long before they were published and 
given to the public, has been tested in the class room and in many an 
office in Maine and New England. They will make their way to 
law students and law offices by virtue of their own inherent merit.
W. E. Walz.

Lectures on Common Law Pleading
These lectures will be divided into the following divisions:
I Introduction.
II Definition and Nature of Pleading.
III General Subdivisions.
IV Parties to the Action.
V The Declaration.
VI Dilatory Pleas.
VII Pleas in Bar.
VIII Demurrers.
IX Some Rules of Pleading.
X Steps to be Taken after Verdict.
XI Peculiarities and Incidents of Pleading.
XII Steps to be Taken after Judgment.
I. INTRODUCTION.
There is an idea which prevails to a great extent among law stu­
dents, and to no little extent among lawyers, and that is that com­
mon law pleading has become and now is virtually obsolete; that it 
is a relic of the past and that a knowledge of its principles is no longer 
essential; that the study of it is useful only to the same extent and in 
the same way and for the same purposes that a study of the history 
of the law is useful and beneficial.
I should certainly be surprised if this idea did not prevail to a 
considerable degree at least among the students of this school.
The first great lesson for you to learn is that common law pleading 
in this country, and especially in Maine, is not obsolete, but in full 
force; that in Maine it may be employed to the extent that it was 
employed, and exists to the same extent that it existed, in England 
before the passage of the Judicature Act in 1873.
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And furthermore, special pleading exists in Maine, notwithstand­
ing the statement of Lord Chief Justice Coleridge in an address be­
fore the law students at Birmingham in 1889, reported in the “Con­
temporary Review,” June number, 1890, that “special pleading 
finds no refuge upon the habitable globe except in the state of New 
Jersey in America.”
I do not state that a defendant must plead specially, but that he 
may plead specially.
Although special pleading was once abolished in this state by the 
Public Laws of 1831, Chapter 514, which provided in substance 
that in all civil actions the general issue shall be pleaded by the de­
fendant and joined by the plaintiff, and which was construed by 
our Supreme Court to amount to an abolition of special pleading, in 
Potter vs. Titcomb, 13 Me. 36, (1836), yet it was afterwards fully 
restored and exists here today.
Revised Statutes, Chapter 84, Section 34, provides, “The gen­
eral issue may be pleaded in all cases, and a brief statement of special 
matter of defence, or special or double pleas in bar may be filed.”
Pleading everywhere, and especially with us, is a most impor­
tant subject. Lord Coke among his frequent commendations upon 
the science of pleading has characterized it as “the truest guide to 
the knowledge of the common law,” and as “ the key that opens its 
inmost recess, and an expositor that discloses and explains the most 
abstruse parts of it.” Again, this great jurist styles pleading as “the 
living voice of the law itself.”
The late Judge Story, eminent jurist and author, well remarked 
“that if the practice of special pleading were entirely abolished from 
courts of justice, the science of pleading would still be the most im­
portant and instructive branch of the common law.”
In a recent work, Pollock and Maitland’s History of the English 
Law, the learned authors say, “Our forms of actions are not mere 
rubrics nor dead categories; they are not the outcome of a classi- 
factory process that has been applied to pre-existing materials; they 
are the institutes of the law; they are, we say it without scruple, liv­
ing things.”
The late James Gould, one of the greatest judges Connecticut ever 
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had, and author of a most admirable work upon pleading, speaking 
of the importance of the subject, said, “It owes its pre-eminence not 
only to the intrinsic value of its own exact and logical principles but 
also, in no small degree, to the fact that the principles of pleading 
are necessarily and closely interwoven, both in theory and practice, 
with those of every other title of the law. I say ‘necessarily inter­
woven’ because even the most simple of the judicial remedies which 
the law affords, and without which it would be practically a dead 
letter, cannot be obtained without the aid of pleading.”
So much for the attestation of great jurists and authors as to the 
relative importance of the subject of pleading.
A few practical illustrations will also serve to impress upon your 
minds the importance of a knowledge of this subject.
For example, you are employed to defend a replevin suit brought 
against your client. A horse which he says he owns has been taken 
away from him by the plaintiff upon a writ of replevin. From an 
examination of the case, you are satisfied that your client has a per­
fect title to the horse. The case comes on for trial and you plead the 
general issue, that is, that you did not take the plaintiff’s horse. 
The plaintiff offers evidence that on January 1, 1899, he bought the 
horse of John Smith, in whose possession the horse was at the time, 
and Smith delivered the horse to him and he paid for it. This 
makes out a prima facie case for the plaintiff and he rests.
You offer evidence that in June 1898, while the horse was owned 
by the said Smith, and while it was in Smith’s possession, you loaned 
Smith one hundred dollars and he gave you a mortgage of the said 
horse to secure the loan, which mortgage was properly recorded. 
The plaintiff objects to the evidence.
What is the result? The court excludes the evidence and the 
plaintiff gets judgment, and why? Because the defendant’s coun­
sel was ignorant of the law of pleading and did not know that title 
in replevin must be specially pleaded and cannot be shown under 
the general issue. In other words, that the general issue in replevin 
does not raise the question of title; that on the contrary, it admits 
the title to be in the plaintiff.
Vickery vs. Sherburne, 20 Me. 34.
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Well, you will say, it is not necessary to know much about plead­
ing because all I need to do is to put in a special plea, or brief state­
ment, with the general issue in every case, and then no harm can come 
to me. Let us see.
It is an elementary principle of law that if a man comes lawfully 
into possession of personal property, an action of replevin or trover 
cannot be maintained against him to recover said property, or its 
value, without proof of a demand and refusal. You are again em­
ployed to defend a replevin suit. Your client came lawfully into 
possession of the horse replevied and the plaintiff made no demand 
before commencing the action. The defendant’s title to the horse 
is, however, a little doubtful. You lost your first case by not putting 
in a brief statement or special plea and you propose to be on the safe 
side this time, so you not only plead the general issue, that you did 
not take the plaintiff’s horse, but you also add a brief statement in 
which you allege that there was no demand and refusal, and that 
at the time the action was commenced the title to the horse was in 
the defendant and not in the plaintiff. You say that that is broad 
enough to cover every conceivable defence.
Plaintiff puts in his evidence but does not prove any demand and 
refusal, although his evidence shows that the defendant came into 
possession of the horse lawfully, and rests.
You move for a non-suit on the ground that he cannot recover 
without proving a demand and refusal, or, perhaps, as your evidence 
of title is a little shaky, you rest and go to the jury without offering 
any evidence. Result, a judgment for plaintiff, because by plead- 
ing title in himself, defendant waives demand and refusal; that is, 
he excuses plaintiff from making any demand. If counsel had 
known enough to have pleaded the general issue alone, he would 
have defeated plaintiff’s action. It is often dangerous to add a 
brief statement and often dangerous not to add it.
Lewis vs. Smart, 67 Me. 206.
Pleading is not only one of the most important subjects of the law 
but it is also one of the most instructive.
A man cannot be a good lawyer, a safe man to employ, who is 




lawyer who has a thorough knowledge of the principles of pleading. 
A man cannot be ignorant of the principles of any subject of the law, 
who possesses a thorough knowledge of the principles of pleading. 
For pleading involves and includes a knowledge of all the principles 
of the substantive law.
To illustrate: In an action for false representation, you must set A 
forth all the essential elements of deceit, and how can a lawyer do 
this who does not know what elements constitute deceit? You. 
must allege a false representation of a material fact, that it was 
made by the defendant with a knowledge of its falsity, that it was 
made to the plaintiff, who was ignorant of its falsity and who be-_ 
lieved it to be true, that it was made with intent that it be acted — 
upon, and that plaintiff acted upon said representation and was, 
thereby damaged. If any one of the five elements of deceit is 
omitted, for instance, if you should fai1 to allege the defendant's 
knowledge of the falsify of the representation, your declaration 
would be worthless.
And, on the other hand, if instead, of bringing an action you are 
defending one, the same is true.
To illustrate: How would a lawyer know what to plead to an
action of slander or libel who had no knowledge of privileged com­
munications?
You must first know what to assert or plead, and secondly, how 
to assert or plead it.
What I have said concerning these two actions is equally applica­
ble to all others.
Pleading is important and instructive and it is also difficult; and, 
being difficult, it is the subject least understood of any branch of the 
law. It is a subject that gives students more trouble than all others 
put together and an exceedingly hard subject to learn from simply 
reading a text book on it. One reason for this is that most of the text 
books upon the subject are nothing more than a compilation of ab­
stract rules without giving the reasons upon which the rules are 
founded.
The statement of principles with citations is useful to the practi­
tioner but of little value to the student. A digest states the princi- 
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pies of law but does not teach the science; and most of the text 
books on pleading no more teach the science of pleading than an 
almanac teaches the science of astronomy. To show how little the 
subject is understood, it is said that forty per cent of the cases in the 
reports in this country are on questions of pleading or practice.
SYSTEMS OF PROCEDURE.
In this country there are three systems of procedure:
1. Common Law as regulated by the rules of the King’s Bench 
and Chancery at the time of our Revolution, with such changes and 
modifications as have been made from time to time by the courts 
and by the legislatures of the states retaining this method of pro­
cedure.
2. Code, or as it is sometimes termed, Reformed Procedure, by 
which the entire practice and procudure in court is regulated by 
positive enactments of the legislature entirely independent of the 
decisions and rules of court. As one writer has aptly said, “Codes 
are framed for, but not by, the judicial power.”
3. Practice Acts. The states whose procedure is regulated by 
practice acts occupy the middle ground between the common law 
and the code states. Practice acts are quasi codes, comprising some 
of the positive enactments of the codes, and some of the rules and 
principles of common law pleading, supplemented by rules adopted 
by the courts. The practice acts have the distinctive features of 
both the other systems.
To my mind, the practice under the common law modified to some 
extent by legislation and supplemented by the rules of court, is the 
clearest and simplest method of procedure. Although efforts have 
been made to improve upon it, and although at one time the code 
procedure, commonly called the “Reformed Procedure,” met with 
great popular favor, it has fallen far short of meeting the expecta­
tions of its admirers. There can be no better evidence of this than 
the report of the committee appointed by the American Bar Asso­
ciation to investigate the different systems of procedure in the differ­
ent states of the Union, and to devise and suggest some universal 
system of practice. I quote from this report:
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“On the other hand the reformed procedure is purely a creature 
of the legislature, and leaves to the court only the enforcement of 
statutory provisions, with no voice in regard to their enactment, 
having its origin with the Field Code of 391 sections, enacted in 
New York in 1848, and reaching its most unhealthy and abnormal 
development in the present code of New York, containing nearly 
3500 sections. It was the direct result of the reaction against the 
refinements, subtleties, and technicalities of the practice and plead­
ing at common law, and sought to avoid these objections by clear­
ness, conciseness, and simplicity. It was doubtless impossible to 
bring any substantial reform through the court and hence resort 
was necessarily had to legislative action, contrary to the established 
customs of the bar and the bench.
“Whatever may be the merits or demerits of the reformed pro­
cedure as such, it must be conceded by its warmest advocates that 
it has not accomplished all that was expected from it at the outset 
and has not fulfilled the reasonable expectations of its supporters 
in simplifying the practice of the law. So much so, that in recent 
years there has been a marked indisposition on the part of the com­
mon law states to adopt the code procedure, or even to take any 
steps in that direction.”
IL DEFINITION AND NATURE OF PLEADING.
Pleading is the statement in a legal and logical manner of those 
facts which constitute the plaintiff’s cause of  action or the defend­
ant’s ground of defence.
In civil actions, the pleadings are reduced to writing, but in crimi­
nal actions, they are usually oral.
While pleading consists merely in alleging matters of fact or in 
denying what is alleged as such by the adverse party, yet in theory 
the averment of facts on either side always presupposes the exis­
tence of some principle or rule of law applicable to the facts 
alleged, which taken in connection with these facts is claimed by 
the party pleading them to operate in his favor.
The principle of law^ applicable to the facts alleged is always im- 
plied and^iged not be expressedin the pleadings.
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By analyzing any good declaration or special plea, and taking 
into consideration with what is expressed that which is necessarily 
supposed and implied, you will find in it all the elements of a syllo­
gism, all pleading being in substance a syllogistic process though 
abridged in fornj.
< To illustrate, if an action is brought for trespass on land, the first 
J or major proposition would be, Against him who has ^forcibly en- 
/ tered upon my land, I have a right by law to recover damages. Sec­
ond or minor proposition^ The defendant has forcibly entered upon 
my land. Third proposition, or conclusion, Therefore, against the 
defendant, I have a right by law to recover damages^
The defendant can contest the plaintiff’s claim in the illustration 
'above given by denying or contesting any one of the three prop­
ositions in the plaintiff’s declaration. If he contests the first, or 
oneof law, he would doso by means of a demurrer^ which would 
raise a question of law.
If he cares to contest the second or minor proposition, he would 
do so by denying the facts therein set forth, and his denial is called 
in law the defendant’s plea.
If not able to contest either the first or second propositions, he 
can contest the third, not by direct denial, for if the first and second 
propositions are true the third must necessarily be true, but by~aiv 
indirect denial; that is, by first confessing and admitting them to be 
true, and then affirmatively setting up some fact or facts inconsist - 
ent with them and which avoid their effect. This is done by a spec­
ial plea which is known in law as a plea of confession and avoidance 
and constitutes what is known in law as special pleading.
If the defendant in the example given above pleads a release by 
the plaintiff of his right of action, his plea fully expressed will form 
a syllogism thus: First or major proposition, If he upon whose land 
I have forcibly entered releases to me his right of action for such 
entry, he has thenceforth no right by law to recover damages for 
said entry. Second or minor proposition, The plaintiff has released 
to me his right of action for my said entry upon his land. Third 
proposition, or conclusion, Therefore the plaintiff has by law no right 
to recover damages of me for the said entry.
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The process in the preceding illustration can if necessary be con­
tinued and repeated until all the allegations on the one side are 
directly denied on the other. Then the parties are said to arrive 
at an issue and the pleadings terminate.
An issuejn pleading isdefined tobeajdngle^ certain, and material 
point arising out of the allegations of the parties consisting regularly, 
of an affirmative on one side and a negative on the other.
There are two kinds of issues:
1. Issues of Law which are raised by demurrer^ When an issue 
of law lsYaised in this manner, all facts well pleaded are admitted 
to be true. That is, all facts properly alleged.
2. Issues of Fact are raised by pleas which are of two kinds^either 
a traverse, or a special plea, that is, in confession and avoidance.
A General Traverse is one which directly denies all the material 
allegations on the other side. A Specific Traverse denies one or 
more essential facts.
A Special Plea indirectly denies the facts alleged on the other side 
by first confessing and admitting them and then avoiding them by 
setting up some new matter repugnant to or inconsistent with the 
right claimed or sought to be established on the other side.
III. GENERAL SUBDIVISIONS OF PLEADING.
The writ, which forms the first stage of a suit at law, is a manda- 
tory precept issued in the name of the sovereign or state for the pur­
pose of compelling the appearance of the defendant at court to ai? 
swer to the plaintiff’s allegations against him_ The writ is no part 
of the pleadings since it does not consist of the allegations and is not 
the act of either party.
Bean vs. Green, 4 Cush. 279.
Whileythe writ is no part of the pleadings, it may for various causes^ 
be destroyed or abated by pleadings^
The pleadings in a civil suit commence with the declaration.
The declaration's a statement at large of the plaintiff’s cause of 
action. More than one cause of action may be embraced in the same 
declaration and on the other hand a single cause of action may be 
set forth in more than one way, in fact, in as many ways as the 
pleader sees fit.
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In order to set forth more than one cause of action in the same dec­
laration, or to set forth a single cause of action in more than one way, 
more than one count must be employed.
A count may be defined to be one of the distinct and separate 
causes of action set forth in the declaration. If there is but one 
cause of action in the declaration set forth in but one way, it is 
called indiscriminately a count or a declaration. If there is more 
than one cause of action or one cause of action set forth in more than 
one way, each statement or setting forth is called a count, and all 
of them taken together constitute a declaration. The chief use of, 
more than one_ count is .to guard against a variance between the dec- 
laration and the proof, and to set out more than one cause of action 
in the same declaration.
The first step for the defendant to take after the writ has been 
served upon him is to appear and answer to the suit at court. An ap­
pearance is effected by the defendant or his attorney writing his 
name or causing it to be written under the name of the defendant 
on the docket of the court.
There are two kinds of appearance, General^ and Special^ 
\ A defendant appears generally when he proposes to put in a de- I 
fence to the merits of the case.
Bank vs. Hervey, 21 Me. 38.
A defendant should appear specially when he wants to take advan­
tage of some informality in the proceedings.
Mitchell vs. Ins. Co., 45 Me. 104.
If the defendant wishes to object to the jurisdiction of the court, 
he should appear in person, for an appearance by attorney, either 
general or special, waives this defect and gives the court jurisdiction, 
except in cases where there is an inherent lack of jurisdiction, that 
is, where there is no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit.
Smith vs. Hunt, 91 Me. 572.
If an attorney acting without authority appears for the defend­
ant, an objection may be made. It is important to note, however, 
that this objection must be made at the return term, or the objection 
is waived.
Prentiss vs. Kelley, 41 Me. 436.
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The defendant, afte£ entering liis name upon_tli£€£ocket in one of. 
the?w?ways above mentioned, must_do one of two things, either 
demurto ^he declarationj>r plead toJt.
If the defendant is of the opinion that the declaration is insuffi­
cient iriTaw, he~should demur. If the defect which he seeks to take 
advantage of is one of substance, he;jnay file a 
which means that he does not assign any cause for demurring, or he 
may file a special demurrer, which does assign a cause for demurring. 
If the defect he seeks to take advantage of is one of form, he must 
file a special demurrer.
If the_ defendant does_not jleniur,_he? jnust plead.
There are two kinds of pleas, Dilatory pleas and Pteas in bar. 
I A dilatory plea is one offering s< >111 c excuse for not pleading in bar, 
'and never goes to the merits of the case. An example of a dilatory 
plea would be a plea to the jurisdiction, a plea in abatement, or a 
plea to the disability of the parties, as for instance, that the plain- 
tiff is a minor and should have brought the suit m the name of his *
next friend.
A plea in bar is a plea to the merits oLtheease.
’ Pleag^in bar are divided ^into^two kinds, Traverses and Pleasin* 
confession and^avoidanc^
See infraf VII Pleas in Bar.
The next step after the defendant’s plea is the plaintiff’s replica­
tion, after which comes the defendant’s rejoinder, which is his re­
ply or answer to the replication.
The next step is the plaintiff’s sur-rejoinder, followed by the 
defendant’s rebutter.
Following this comes the plaintiff’s sur-rebutter.
No train of pleading has ever been known to go beyond this point, 
and in practice you seldom go beyond the replication.
The statute provides that the general issue may be pleaded in all 
cases and the defendant may file a brief statement of special mat- 
ter of defence,. When this is done, the only reply necessary for the 
plaintiff to make is to join in the general issue. It is not necessary 
for the plaintiff to reply to the brief statement, though he may do so 
if he sees fit byjiling a counter brief statement.
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IV. PARTIES TO THE ACTION.
The^general ruk is that the action must be brought in the name 
of the person whosejegal rights have been infringed and against the 
party who committed or caused the injury, or by or against their 
personal representatives.
I. EX CONTRACTU.
(a) WHO SHALL BE PLAINTIFF.
(1) Contracts Under Seal.
The person tc sue on a contract under seal at common law is thg 
person to whom the promise or, more properly speaking, the cove; 
nant is expressed in the contract made, that is, the covenantee. This is 
tmc even though the covenantee has no beneficial interest therein. 
This is true even though it is expressly stated in the contract that 
the promise is made to the covenantee for the sole and exclusive 
benefit of a person other than the covenantee; as where A promises 
B to pay $1,000 to C, the action must be brought in the name of B 
and not of C.
Hinkley vs. Fowler, 15 Me. 285.
Brann vb. Me. Benefit Ass’n, 92 Me. 34 L
In a case of this kind, where there is a contract under seal, the 
action must not only be brought in the name of the covenantee, but 
also on the covenant.
For example, in the case of a bond to convey real property, if the 
covenantor does not convey, the action must be brought on the 
bond for damages, and not in assumpsit to recover the money paid. 
C&arles vs. Dana, 14 Me. 383.
(2) Simple Contracts.
In actions upon simple contracts, an entirely different rule pre­
vails.
On contracts not under seal, whether oral or written, the action 
may be brought in the name of the person to whom the promise is 
made, that is, the promisee, but it may also be brought in the name 
of the person from whom the consideration moved,[though he be a 
person other than the promisee.
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The reason for this rule is that where one person owes to another 
in right and justice a strong and clearly defined duty to do some act, 
the law will imply and create the promise to do the act, though no 
express promise ever existed. The law implies the promise on ac­
count of the existing duty.
Hinkley vs. Fowler, 15 Me. 285.
Bohanan vs. Pope, 42 Me. 93.
Brewer vs. Dyer, 7 Cush. 337.
Joinder of Plaintiffs*
When a contract, whether oral or written or under seal, made 
with several persons, is joint,_ah . niust,_if living, be joined in an, 
action upon jt.
If one or more joint promisees die before the action is commenced. 
it should be brought in the name of the survivors, and it should be 
stated in the writ why the other promisees are not joined, that is. 
that they are dead.
A contract with several persons is joint if their legal interest is 
joint, though the contract may be in terms joint and several. In 
determining whether a contract is joint or several, you must look 
not only to the language but also to the interests of the promisees.
In simple contracts, it is often difficult to tell whether they are 
joint or several and who should be made plaintiff in an action upon 
them. These rules may be of some benefit:
First, Where ^the consideration moves from several jointly, 
payment from a joint fund, or where there is an express joint prom- 
ise, or where the consideration has moved separately from each but 
the benefit to be derived is joint, the action should be brought by all.
Lombard vs. Cobb, 14 Me. 222.
Second, Where there is a separate consideration moving from 
different persons, it is considered to be a contract of each, and they 
cannot join in an action for the breach of it, but must sue severally.
LombarcTvs. Cobb, supra.
'P16 reasonMor this rule is that one person should not be allowed 
to sueTor the whole"of that of which he is entitled to only a part, or 
by joining some other person with him, to make the defendant liable 
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to a third party to whom he owed no legal duty, and to whom he 
made no promise.
Death of Contractees.
At common law on the death of a contractee, if the contract was 
joint, the right of action passed to the survivor, and on the death of 
the last survivor, to his personal representatives.
By statute, after an action which survives has been commenced 
by or against several persons in a joint action, if one dies pending 
the suit, his executor or administrator may voluntarily become a 
party to the suit, or he may be summoned into court and made a 
party.
Me. R. S. (1903) Chap. 89, Sect. 12.
Treat vs. Dwinel, 59 Me. 341.
Assignees.
At common law, the right to sue a person _could not be assigned. 
so as to give the assignee a right of action in his own name. The 
suit had tobc brought in the name of the assignor for the benefit of 
the assignee.
Moore vs. Coughlin, 4 Allen, 335.
Brigham vs. Clark, 20 Pick. 43.
If the assignor be dead, the action at common law is brought in 
the name of his personal representatives.
To this rule there are five exceptions:
Exception I.
Contracts or choses in action assignable by custom, such as prom­
issory notes, bills of exchange, checks, etc., which according to the 
custom of the law merchant are transferable.
Exception II.
Where a debtor after assignment promises to pay assignee.
Norris vs. Hall, 18 Me. 332.
Lang vs. Fiske, 2 Fairfield, 385.
Vose vs. Treat, 58 Me. 378.
Exception III.
Actions on covenants which run with the land.
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The chief characteristics of such covenants are that the coven­
antee must have some interest in the land to which the coven­
ant refers.
The usual covenants in a deed are the covenant of seisin, of the 
right to sell and convey, against incumbrances, forjjuiet enjoyment, 
and of general warranty. The first three at common law are coven­
ants in praesenti and do not run with the land. They are broken 
when made, if at all. The last two are covenants in futuro, and mn 
wfith the land.
Allen vs. Little, 36 Me. 170.
Heath vs. Whidden, 24 Me. 383.
Me. R. S. Chap. 84, Sect. 30.
Exception IV.
Assignments by operation of law.
In the event of the death of a plaintiff, his right to sue is trans­
ferred by operation of law to his personal representatives. So in 
the event of the bankruptcy of a person, his right to sue is trans­
ferred by operation of law to his trustee in bankruptcy.
Exception V.
Contracts made assignable by statute,
Revised Statutes, Chapter 84, Sect. 146, provides that assignees of 
choses in action, not negotiable, assigned in writing, may bring 
actions in their own names, but the assignee shall hold the assignor 
harmless of costs, and shall file with his writ the assignment or a 
copy thereof.
For example, you are employed to defend a suit that has been 
brought by the assignee of the claim. You examine the papers and 
find that neither the assignment nor a copy thereof has been filed. 
A safe thing to do would be to file a plea or motion in abatement 
during the first two days of the term.
In case the declaration does not show an assignment, of course 
you would object to it when it was offered in evidence. If you were 
plaintiff in the suit and found that you had not filed your assign­
ment, you should ask the court to allow you to file it.
I wish to call your attention to the case of Littlefield vs. Pinkham, 
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72 Me. 369.^ Here the court seemed to hold that if you would take 
advantage of the failure to file the assignment, you must plead it in 
abatement, and if you do not, you waive it. See also,
Bank vs. Gooding, 87 Me. 337.
Damren vs. Amer. Lt. & Power Co., 91 Me. 334. 
Me. R. S. Chap. 84, Sect. 146.
Now I cannot reconcile those cases and I do not see how any one 
can. If I were for the defendant and the assignment was not filed, 
I should plead in abatement, as that is safe. If I did not know of it 
in season to do so, I should object to it when it was offered and cite 
the case in 91 Me.
If I were for the plaintiff, I should ask leave of the court to file the 
assignment and take the position that the defendant had waived 
the objection, citing the Littlefield vs. Pinkham case.
Principal and Agent,
If a person makes a contract through an agent, it is, in law, the 
contract of the principal, and the principal, and not the agent, is the 
proper person to sue for a breach of it.
Garland vs. Reynolds, 20 Me. 45.
Borrowscale vs. Bosworth, 99 Mass. 378.
There are three exceptions to this rule,
Exception I. Contracts Under Seal.
At common law, if an agent makes a contract for his principal 
which is under seal and taken in the name of the agent, the action 
must be brought in the name of the agent, even though it is stated in 
the body of the contract that he is acting as agent for his principal.
Wilks vs. Back, 2 East, 142; s. c. 102 Engl. Reprint, 323. 
Exception II, Promissory Notes.
If an agent takes a note for bis principal and has the note made 
payable to himself, that is, if he is named as payee in it, and the note 
is not negotiated, the action must be brought in the name of the 
agent.
Exception III.
Where by the authorized terms of the contract, the right to sue 
upon it is expressly restricted to the agent.
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Sometimes on a contract made by an agent, either may sue:
First, Where the agent is treated as the actual party with whom 
the contract is made, the reason for this being that a person has a 
right to know with whom he is doing business.
Cothay vs. Fennell, 10 B. & C. 672.
Second, Where the agent has made a contract in his own name 
(at common law not under seal) for an undisclosed principal.
Cushing vs. Rice, 46 Me. 303.
An undisclosed principal means either a principal who is known 
to exist but whose name is not known to the party contracting, or a 
principal whose existence is unknown.
If an undisclosed principal comes forward and brings an action 
upon a contract of his agent, he must put the. defendant in the same 
position at the time of the disclosure that he would have occupied 
had the agent been the real contracting party. The defendant can 
set off against the principal any claims that he might have against 
the agent.
Traub vs. Milliken, 57 Me. 63.
Third, Where the agent has made a contract in the subject mat­
ter of which he has a special interest. Under this head come auction­
eers, and other agents who have possession coupled with some inter­
est, as an agent who has a lien upon the goods or property for his 
services.
Porter vs. Raymond, 53 N. H. 519.
It has been held, however, that a broker is not such an agent as 
can sue in his own name.
Fairlie vs. Fenton, 1 L. R. V Exch. Cases, 169.
Fourth, Where the agent has paid his principal’s money 
under circumstances which give him a right to recover it back. For 
instance, if he pays it to someone in good faith, thinking he has a 
right to pay it, when he has not, he has a right to bring suit in his 
own name to recover it so as to pay the money over to the principal 
for whom he has been holding it in trust.
But the agent’s^ right to sue is subject to the interposition of the 
principal, except in those cases where the agent has some special 
Tnterest In the subject matter of the contract.
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Where an agent of an undisclosed principal who has no interest in 
the contract sues in his own name, the defendant may avail himself 
of those defences which are good against the agent, and also those 
which are good against the principal for whose benefit the action is 
brought.
Thompson vs. Davenport, 3 Smith’s Ld. Cases, 1648.
A person who enters into a contract in reality for himself, but ap­
parently as an agent for another whom he does not name, can sue on 
the contract as principal.
But a person who contracts in reality for himself, but apparently 
as agent for another whose name he gives, cannot sue as principal. 
Winchester vs. Howard, 97 Mass. 303.
Partnership
Actions in which a firm is plaintiff should be brought in the name 
of the individual members composing the firni, and not in the firm 
name.
There are two exceptions or modifications of this rule:
First, dormant partners, and second, nominal partners.
A dormant partner is a person who does .not appear to be a part- 
ner, but who really is so in fact. He never need join with the other 
partners, but of course he may do so if he chooses.
A nominal partner is a person who appears to be a partner bpt 
who is not one in fact.
Sometimes he must and sometimes he need not join with the other 
partners as a co-plaintiff.
(a) . If a contract is made expressly with a real and a nominal 
partner, both must join in suing upon it.
(b) . Prima facie, a nominal partner ought to join in suing on a 
contract made by a firm, either express or implied, but if it can be 
shown by clear and unmistakable evidence that the nominal partner 
is in reality not a partner, and that he has no interest whatever in 
the business, an action can be maintained in the name of the real 
partner alone.
Kell vs. Nainby, 10 B. & C. 20; s. c. 109 Engl. Reprint, 358. 
Jellison vs. Lafonta, 19 Pick. 244.-
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There is one principle in regard to suits by partners which you 
want to bear in mind, andjhatjs that one partnercannotsue another 
upon anymatters concerning the partnership business,The^ im 
jured party must seek redress in a, court of empty.
" HaweTon to Actions, section 88.
The one exception to this rule is in case of fraud practiced by ong z'
partner upon another.
Farnsworth vs. Whitney,
On the death of a partner, the surviving partners and ultimately^ 
the~ lasT?urvivo~and~^oirTiis deathTus^personaT representatives, 
must sue on contracts made by the firm,.
Corporations*.
An action by a corporation must be brought in the corporate 
name^not in the names "of the persons who compose it.
Infants,
A suit by an infant must be brought in the name of the infant’s 
next friend.
Raymond vs. Sawyer, 37 Me. 406.
Bernard vs. Merrill, 91 Me. 358.
Blood vs. Harrington, 8 Pick. \552.
gxception to the rule: When an infant is a co-executor with an adult. 
Sick vs. Michigan Aid Ass., 49 Mich. 50.
Advantage can be taken only by plea in abatement^ 
"McHullin vs? McMullin^92 Me. 338. "
Smith vs. Carney, 127 Mass. 179.
In Maine, by statute, a married woman may prosecute or defend 
suits  ̂In law or In equity, ^th.er in tort or in Contract, in her own 
without the joinder of her husband^for the preservation and 
protection of her property or personal rights, or for the redress of 
herlnjuries, as if unmarried, or may do so jointly with her husband: 
and the husband shall not settle or discharge any such action with­
out the written consent of the wife. Neither of them can be arrested 
on such a writ or execution, nor can the husband alone maintain an 
action respecting his wife’s property.
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-----Me. R. S. Chap. 63, Sect. 5.
With__one exception there is nothing to hinder a married woman 
from entering into a contract, with her husband; she and her hus^ 
band cannot_entcr into a contract „of .partnership witlTe'ach other.I 
In Haggett vs Hurley, 91 Me. 542, the court held, “She cannot form 
—a business partnership with her husband and thereby subject her 
personal estate to debts contracted by the partnership.”
While a married woman in this state may make a contract with 
her husband, it is difficult to enforce such a contract. A ^wife.cajinot 
sue her husband^ at common law.
Smith vs. Gorman, 41 Me. 405.
Neither can the_husband^sue, the wife during-nnverture.
Hobbs vs. Hobbs, 70 Me. 381.
Carlton vs. Carlton, 72 Me. 115.
A wife during^coverture cannot maintain an actiop upon a .con­
tract ^madewith'her husband before marriage v but she can after 
divorce^She can_then jnaintain an action upon any contract made 
before or du ring_ marriage.
Webster vs. Webster, 58 Me. 139.
Neither can the assignee of the wife or husband maintain an action 
against the other, but may have recourse to equity.
Perkins vs. Blethen, 107 Me. 443.
Neither a wife nor husband can maintain an action against the 
other for a tort committed during coverture, even after a divorce. 
Abbott vs. Abbott, 67 Me. 304. (Peters C. J.)
Executors, Administrators and Heirs.
If a person dies, the proper person to sue for a breach of a con­
tract made with the deceased is Jiis_personal representative. This 
rule obtains whether the breach occurs before or after his death.
There is one important difference between the rights of an executor 
and an administrator in reference to commencing actions.
An executor derives his authoritsyfrom the will and can^commence 
an action the moment the testator dies, even before thejwill is pro­
bated
Rand vs. Hubbard, 4 Mete. 252.
Strong vs. Perkins, 3 N. H. 517.
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An administrator takes his authority from the letters of adminis- 
tratipp iggl1p^fr^h(m~bv the probate court. and cannot commence an 
action untU_^chJ^te£sJ^ve^en issued to him.
^Williams on Executors, 6th ed., Page 296.
' (b) WHO SHALL BE DEFENDANT.
The general rule is that no person can be sued for the breach of a 
contract unless~ he is a^party to iL
’ But an exception would be a person appointed by statute to stand 
in the place of the contractor after his death, as an executor.
(I) Contracts Under Seal.
The person to be sued for the breach of a contract under seal is 
the person by whom the contract appears to be made, that is, the 
covenantor.
Briggs vs. Partridge, 64 N. Y. 357.
Duvall vs. Craig, 2 Wheaton, (U. S.) 45.
This is true even though the covenantor expresses himself as cov­
enanting for another, as when A covenants in behalf of B.
(2) Simple Contracts.
The person to be sued for the breach of a simple contract is the 
person who promises or allows credit to be given him.
McGreary vs. Chandler, 58 Me. 537.
Davis vs. Patrick, 122 U. S. 138.
Stearns vs. Foote, 20 Pick. 432.
Joinder of Defendants
It is the general rule that where several persons are jointly, liable 
on a contract, they must all be joinedin an action for a breach 
thereof/
Searles vs. Reed, 63 Mich. 485.
Castner vs. Slater, 50 Me. 212.
There are certain exceptions, however.
Exception I.
Where one joint promisor resides out of the jurisdiction, having^ 
no attorney, tenant, or agent therein, so that no ser-, 
vice can be made upon hirp
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Dennett vs. Chick, 2 Me. 191.
Rand vs. Nutter, 56 Me. 339.
Exception II.
Where one joint promisor had died before the action was com- 
merifed. " . ——
Harwood vs. Roberts, 5 Me. 441.
Goodhue vs. Luce, 82 Me. 222.
Exception HI.
Where one joint contractor has pleaded infancy, judgment may 
be recovered against the remaining contractors. .
CuttF‘v“Gordon, 13 Me. 474.
Exception IV.
Where one promisor has pleaded bankruptcy, judgment may be 
recovered against the remaining co-promisors,
““ Toburn vs. Ware, 25 Me. 330.
West vs. Furbish,’67 Me. 17.
If the contractors bind themselves jointly and severally they may 
be sued either jointly or severally at the option of the contractees.
Liability to an action on a contract made jointly passes at the 
death of each to the survivors, and on the death of the last, to his 
personal representatives.
Principal and Agent*
The general rule is that on a contract made with an agent the action 
shoulcFbe brought against the principal
Mann vs. Chandler, 9 Mass. 335.
Exception 1.
Where an agent contracts by deed in his own name. This com- 
mon law rule has been modified by statute in Maine (Chapter 75, 
Sect. 15) providing “deeds and contracts executed by an authorized 
agen^ of a person oiycorporation in the name of his principal or in 
his own name for his principal, are in law the deeds and contracts of 
the principal.”
Nobleboro vs. Clark, 68 Me. 87.
Simpson vs. Garland, 72 Me. 40.
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Exception IE
Where an agent makes a note or draws a bill of exchange in his
own name,
Williams vs. Robbins, 16 Gray, 77.
Exception IIE
Where credit is given exclusively to the agent, when thejimicipal 
is known..
Exception IV.
Where the agent, though acting for his principal, so contracts as 
to make himself personally liable.
Goodwm vs. Bowden, 54 Me. 424.
Exception V.
Where an agent contracts for an undisclosed principal, or where 
an agent induces credit to be given to himself without disclosing his 
agency.
If an agent enters into a contract for his principal without authori­
ty, he is not personally liable on the contract, although he is liable 
otherwise.
Neither would the principal be liable on such a contract. 
Williams vs. Robbins, 16 Gray, 77.
Partnership.
All persons who are members of a firm or unincorporated com­
pany at the time a contract is made by the firm or company should 
be joined in an action against it.
Smith vs. Canfield, 8 Mich. 493.
The same rule that I gave you in regard to plaintiffs holds good. 
The action should be brought against the members and not against 
the firm by its firm nameT
On the death of a member of a firm, the survivors are the proper 
persons to be sued.
Dormant partners need not be made defendants  ̂
Lord vs. Baldwin, 6 Pick. 348.
Cleveland vs. Woodard, 15 Vt. 302. s. c. 40 Am. Dec. 682. But 
always may be joined.
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Dry Dock Co. vs. Treadwell, 19 Wend. 525.
But a judgment against ostensible partners will bind interest of 
dormant partners in firm property.
Wright vs. Herrick, 125 Mass. 154.
Plaintiff may waive estoppel of nominal partner and not join him. 
Hatch vs. Wood, 43 N. H. 633.
Corporations.
A corporation or an incorporated body must be sued in its cor­
porate name.
Even though contract is in name of officer or agent.
Infants.
Actions on contracts of minors should be brought against the 
fno'r and not against the guardian ad litem, whosedutylt is to look 
out for the interests of the minor in the suit.
Tucker vs. Bean, 65 Me. 352.
Wakefield vs. Marr, 65 Me. 341.
If you fail to have a guardian ad litem appointed, any judgment 
against the minor will be voidL
Swan vs. Horton, 14 Gray, 179.
The same rule does not hold good in the case of an insane per­
son? “
Guardian ad litem cannot bind infant by admissions.
Stinson vs. Pickering, 70 Me. 273.
Executors, Administrators and Heirs*.
The personal representatives of a deceased person can be sued on 
contracts made with the deceased person whether broken before or 
after his death.
Cawley vs. Reeve, 17 N. J. L. 415.
There is one exception^-contracts limited to the life-time of the 
contractor.
An action can be commenced against an executor before probate, 
buUnot1 "against an "administrator before letters of administration 
are granted to him.
On all contracts made by an executor or an administrator, though 
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expressly for and on behalf of the estate, the action must be brought 
against him personally.
Davis vs. French, 20 Me. 21.
The heir can be sued upon the following contracts of the deceased:
1----Contracts by deed inwhich the contractor binds, himself and
his lieiry
2. Covenants real.
The cormnorHawhability of an heir upon a covenant made by his 
ancestor is superseded by our statutes for the distribution and settle­
ment of estates, which render such liability contingent upon the in­
ability of the creditor, from the nature of his claim, to procure satis­
faction during the existence of administration.
Royce vs. Burrill, 12 Mass. 395. 
Webber vs. Webber, 6 Me. 127, 137.
Me. R. S. Chap. 89, Sects. 16, 17 and 18.
A devisee is liable under the same circumstances under which an 
heir would be liable.
In no case can an executor or an administrator be sued together^ 
with an heir or devisee., /
2. EX DELICTQ. d
(a.) WHOJSHALL BE PLAINTIFF.
In actions of tort, the person to be made plaintiff is he whose rights 
either personal or property, have been violated-
Day vs. Whitney, 1 Pick. 503. 
Mayall vs. Boston &c., 19 N. H. 122.
Sometimes two persons may, independently of each other, be en- 
titled to bring an action of tort against the same defendant for the, 
same injury.
Joinder of Plaintiff s.
Whether two or more persons should be joined in an action of tort 
as plaintiffs depends upon two things"
the injury is to the joint right of several, all must sue. 
McArthur vs? Lane, 15 Me. 245.
Sccond, If the wrongful act caused a joint resulting damage to 
them all, all must sue, though the wrong be a separate injury to each.
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Hart vs. Fitzgerald, 2 Mass. 509.
Patten vs. Gurney, 17 Mass. 182.
Bray vs. Raymond, 166 Mass. 146.^*^
2 Saunders Reports, 115-116.
If both entirety of interest and joint damage are wanting, they 
must sue separately. A wrong to one person cannot in law be a 
prejudice to another nor would there be any standard by which in 
such a case an entire sum could be assessed as damages.
(b).  WHO SHALL BE DEFENDANT*
The proper person to be made defendant in an action of tort is he 
whose^wrongfuTact has Caused the injury, and it matters not whether 
he caused it by his own hand or by the hand of another, if done by
the defendant’s express command or with his sanction or in the 
regular course of an authorized employment or business of the de­
fendant and in furtherance of that business.
Tripp vs. Leland, 42 Vt. 487.
Moore vs. Tracy, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 229.
Joinder of Defendants*
First, If the wrongful act was one which in legal consideration 
could be Committed by several persons, the plaintiff may sue any 
number jointly or may sue any one alone.
Patten vs. Gurney, 17 Mass. 182.
Page vs. Parker, 40 N. H. 47. 
Olsen vs. Upsahl, 69 Ill. 273.
k Harris vs. Huntington, 2 Tyler, (Vt.) 129.
There is a distinction between cases of contract and tort in regard 
the right of contribution. If several persons are liable on a con­
tract and you collect the whole amount from one, he has a right of 
action against the others for contribution. It is different in cases of 
tort. There is no contribution between‘wrongdoer^
Second, If the wrongful act is one which several cannot commit 
jointly, but can only be considered the distinct tort of each, though 
several participated, each must be sued separately.
Klander vs. McGrath, 35 Pa. St. 128, s. c. 78 Am. Dec. 329.
For instance, if several persons should say the same thing about a 
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person amounting to slander, that person would have to bring sep­
arate actions against each.
HOW TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OFJUSJOINDER_AND NONJOINDER 
---------------------- 0F parties!
L Ex Contractu.
(a). Nonjoinder and Misjoinder^ Plaintiffs.
If in an action upon a contract, one person sues when the.rightof 
action Is“mTTmsdf and another (nonjoinder) or if two or moresue 
together when the right of action is in one alone (misjoin^) ^advan­
tage may be taken of the?mistake as well under the general issue as.
by aplea in abatement.
Marshall vs. Jones, 11 Me. 54.
Austin vs. Walsh, 2 Mass. 401. 
White vs. Curtis, 35 Me. 534. 
Holyoke vs. Loud, 69 Me. 59. 
Halliday vs. Doggett, 6 Pick. 359. 
Hall vs. Adams, 1 Aikens, (Vt.) 166. 
Ulmer vs. Cunningham, 2 Me. 117. (Misjoinder).
The contract offered in evidence will not in either case correspond 
with the one declared on, so there will be a variance between the 
declaration and the proof.
Rule.
If the proof which supports the objections arising from misjoinder 
or nonjoinder goes in denial or disproof of the declaration, or any 
material allegation in it, advantage may be taken of the mistake as 
well under the general issue as by a plea in abatement, for whatever 
denies the declaration goes in support of the general issue. If on 
the other hand the proof which shows the mistake does not deny 
and is not inconsistent with any material part of the declaration, the 
mistake can only be taken advantage of by a plea in abatement.
To this rule there are two exceptions.
Exception I.
I£ln an action upon a contract it appears on the face of the declara­
tion that there is a misjoinder or a nonjoinder of the parties, advan­
tage can be taken by demurrer. For when from the plaintiff’s own
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declaration it appears that he has no right of action, there is no neces­
sity of the defendant pleading the fact which occasioned it. 
Exception II.
Nonjoinder of co-executors or co-administrators does not in any 
respect involve a contradiction of the declaration because they are 
not parties to the contract. The only remedy is by a plea in abate­
ment.
(b) * Nonjoinder of Defendants*
Advantage can be taken only by a plea in abatement unless it ap­
pears on the face of the record, in which case advantage can be taken 
by demurrer.
Chick vs. Trevett, 20 Me. 462.
The reason is that if A and B promise, the promise is A’s, although 
not his sole promise, and the fact that B promised with A does not 
disprove the allegation in the declaration that A promised.
(c) . Misjoinder of Defendants.
; Misjoinder can be taken advantage of either under the general 
l^sue or by plea in abatement, for if A and B are sued on a contract 
made by A alone, the evidence that A alone promised, disproves the 
declaration and supports the general issue.
Bangor Bank vs. Treat, 6 Me. 207. 
Walcott vs. Canfield, 3 Ct. 194.
2. Ex Delicto.
(a)* Nonjoinder of Plaintiffs*
Nonjoinder of plaintiffs in tort can be taken advantage of only by 
a plea of abatement, for proof that the right violated was joint does 
not disprove the declaration that defendant injured plaintiff’s prop­
erty; on the contrary, it admits that fact but simply shows that the 
injury was not to his sole property.
Lothrop vs. Arnold, 25 Me. 136.
May vs. Western Union Tel. Co., 112 Mass. 90.
Call vs. Buttrick, 4 Cush. 345.
The fact of non-joinder may be shown under the general issue for 
one purpose only, not that of defeating the action but of reducing 
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the damages. Otherwise the plaintiff might recover damages for 
the full amount of the injury and still leave the defendant liable to 
the other party in interest.
(b) . Misjoinder of Plaintiffs.
Misjoinder of plaintiffs in tort can be taken advantage of as well 
under the general issue as by a plea in abatement. For example, 
for trespass on the land of A, A and B sue. Proof that B has no 
interest in the land and therefore has not been damaged disproves 
the declaration.
Glover vs. Hunnewell, 6 Pick. 222.
Vinton vs. Welsh, 9 Pick. 87.
(c) . Non Joinder of Defendants.
Nonjoinder of defendants in tort cannot be taken advantagejjf. 
even jn abatement.
Buddington vs. Shearer, 22 Pick. 428.
Exception.
Where one is sued alone in tort upon a cause of action arising out 
of or concerning real property held by him jointly, or in common 
with other persons, he may plead the nonjoinder of his co-tenant in^ 
abatement.
The reason for the exception is that in every such suit the inter­
ests of all tenants are necessarily in question, a reason not applica­
ble to cases where a tort committed by several persons does not arise 
out of or concern a joint or common estate of their own.
(d) . Misjoinder of Defendants.
Misjoinder^of defendants in tort cannot be taken advantage of 
even in "abatement.
Keer vs. Oliver, 61 N. J. L. 154.
The__proper course for those not properly joined and hence not 
guilty is to plead no/BaQ^the general issue2 For a 
plea in abatement setting up the misjoinder would in reality amount 
to the general issue, and so would be held bad on demurrer.
The following is a chart which condenses the whole subject:
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EX CONTRACTU:
Plaintiffs : Nonjoinder : General issue or abatement.
Misjoinder: General issue or abatement.
Defendants : Nonjoinder : Plea in abatement only. 








Plea in abatement only.
Plea in abatement or general issue.
No remedy except in cases con 
cerning real property held jointly. 
No remedy. Those not guilty must 
plead the general issue.
V. THE DECLARATION.
The first step in the pleadings is the declaration, which is a state 
ment liTdetail of the facts which constitute the plaintiff’s cause d| 
fcgctiQn. '
- A count is one of the separate and distinct causes of action set 
forth in the declaration.
An action iFa proceeding in a court of justice for the establishment 
,Lu of a right, the redress of an injury, or for the punishment of a person 
forthe commission of a crime.
FORMS OF ACTIONS.
Actions are divided into two classes, civil and criminal.
Civil Actions are of three kinds, real, personal and mixed.
1. Real actions are those brought for the specific recovery of 
real property only.
II. Personal actions are those brought for the recovery of a debt 
or specific personal_prupert v
III. Mixed actions are those brought for the recovery of real
property and for damages for any injury in respect to it, usually 
termed mesne profits. •
I. The real actions are (a) writ of entry^ (b) (wrrtofdower,J(c)
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(a) A writ of entry is an action brought for the purpose of trying 
the title to land. With us, this action is regulated and prescribed 
by statute. (Chapter 106.)
(b) A writ of dower is an action brought by a widow for the 
specific recovery of her dower, no part having been assigned to her, 
against the tenant in possession.
Me. R. S. Chap. 105.
In 1895 there was a statute passed abolishing dower, and making 
the wife an heir, or quasi heir, of her husband. There is no form 
of action prescribed in the statute, but it has been determined by a 
decision that the proper form is a petition for partition.
Longley vs. Longley, 92 Me. 395.
(c) Forcible Entry and Detainer is an action brought for the 
recovery of the possession of real property.
There are not with us any real actions, to speak strictly, as in all 
of them we recover mesne profits.
In real actions, the party bringing the action is called the demand­
ant and the party against whom it is brought is called the tenant.
II. PersonaI~_Actions are divided into two great classes: ex 
contractu and ex delicto.
ACTIONS EX CONTRACTU.
There are three kinds of actions ex contractu: 
and 3, assumpsit.
1, debt; 2, covenant
J. Debt lies for the recovery of a fixed or liquidated sum of 
money upon a contract?nde? seal or not or upon a judgment or 
"statute------------------------- --
An action of debt will not lie for the recovery of an uncertain sum 
of money, for the recovery of an installment, or part of a debt pay­
able in installments, or upon a promise to pay out of a particular 
fund, or in a particular kind of money or in property or in services.
There are four kinds of actions of debt:
First.
Debt on Simple Contracts.
The essential allegations are,
- (p 3 U,
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A statement of the debt or contract.
A statement of the breach.
The damages.
McVicker vs. Beedy, 31 Me. 314.
Raborg vs. Peyton, 2 Wheaton, (U. S.) 385.
Portland vs. Atlantic R. R. Co., 66 Me. 485.
Second.
Debt on Contracts under Seal.
The essential allegations are,
(1) . A description of the specialty.
(2) . Non-payment by the defendant.
(3) . The damages.
Third.
Debt on a Judgment.
The essential allegations are,
(1) . A statement or description of the judgment.
(2) Non-payment or non-satisfaction.
' (3). The damages.
McKim vs. Odom, 12 Me. 94.
Bissell vs. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462.
Fourth.
Debt on Statutes
The essential allegations are,
(1) . A statement of the act or omission in violation of the statute.
(2) . Non-payment of the debt or penalty.
(3) . The damages.
If a debt or penalty is created by statute, but no form of action is 
prescribed for its recovery, debt is the proper form.
Lebanon vs. Olcott, 1 N. H. 339.
Bigelow vs. Cambridge, etc. Corp., 7 Mass. 202.
2. Covenant lies for the breach of a contract under seaL
The essential allegations are,
(1) . A statement of the covenant.
(2) . A statement of the breach.
. (3). The damages.
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distinguished from an expressone_
~THebasis of the action promise implied by law from the execu­
tion of the consideration or from the legal duty resting on the de-
f endant.
The essential a,llegations are^
(1) "^^tate^ntoTthe-consideration
(2) . A promise by the defendant.
(3) . ^Breach of thatjuomiso.
(4) . The damages.
Special assumpsit lies on an express—prom/se whether oral_or— 
written, if not under seal.
The essential allegations are,
(1) . A statement of the contract relied upon, including the con­
sideration.
(2) . Full performance on plaintiff’s part, including a performance 
of all conditions precedent, and a readiness and willingness to per­
form all concurrent conditions.
(3) . A breach by the defendant.
(4) . The damages.
Rule.
The general rule is that there cannot be an implied promise,where 
there is an express one already existing, and that therefore genera^ 
assumpsit will~nbthe~upon an express^contract.
From the exis fence of certain circumstances, the law creates a 
promise, and upon this promise you bring general assumpsit, but the 
law does not create a promise where the parties have made nru?_ 
themselves. Where they make one themselves, there is no need for 
the law to make one for them, and you should bring special and not 
general assumpsit.
There aie four exceptions to this rule:
Exception I.
General assumpsit will lie where there has been a full performance 
of an express contract nn --- 1 .— o^an express contract on the plaintiff’s part and nothing remains to
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be done but the payment of the money by the defendant. Plaintiff 
has his option, and can bring either general or special assumpsit 
Felton vs. Dickinson, 10 Mass. 287.
Knight vs. The N. E. Worsted Co., 2 Cush. 271.
Baker vs. Corey, 19 Pick. 496. 
Hunneman vs. Grafton, 10 Mete. 454.
It is to be borne in mind that the amount of damages recoverable 
under the exception given above will be limited to that fixed by the 
terms of the express contract.
The reason is that where the parties have fixed a price in the 
contract, the law will not fix a different one.
Exception II.
' Where after part performance by the plaintiff, further performance 
was prevented by the defendant or by some act not within either 
party’s control, which in law operates as a discharge of the contract] 
or if the contract is abandoned or rescinded by mutual agreement, 
general assumpsit will lie.
Moulton vs. Trask, 9 Mete. 577.
Hill vs. Green, 4 Pick. 113.
Wright vs. Haskell, 45 Me. 489.
Lakeman vs. Pollard, 43 Me. 465.
While you may bring general assumpsit, you are not obliged to. 
You may declare upon the special contract, alleging that it has been 
broken by the defendant, and recover damages for the breach of it. 
Jones vs. Judd, 4 N. Y. 412.
Derby vs. Johnson, 21 Vt. 17.
Exception III.
General Assumpsit will lie where there is a failure on the plaintiff’s 
part of the strict performance of all the terms of the express contract, 
but where he has acted in good faith and the defendant has accepted 
the benefit of that which he has done.
White vs. Oliver, 36 Me. 92.
Hayward vs. Leonard, 7 Pick. 181.
Blood vs. Wilson, 141 Mass. 25.
Kelly vs. Bradford, 33 Vt. 35.
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Blakeslee vs. Holt, 42 Conn. 226.
Wadleigh vs. Sutton, 6 N. H. 15.
(Cases Contra)
Smith vs. Brady, 17 N. Y. 173.
Bogarth vs. Dudley, 44 N. J. L. 304.
Miller vs. Phillips, 31 Pa. St. 218. 
Elliott vs. Caldwell, 43 Minn. 357.
Exception IV.
r If the special contract which the plaintiff has partially performed 
is void or voidable but not illegal, and has been avoided by the plaintiff 
or the defendant, general assumpsit may be maintained for the 
partial performance.
Thurston vs. Percival, 1 Pick. 415.
For example, if an infant performs services under a special contract 
which he avoids before full performance, he may recover for the 
partial performance in general assumpsit.
Moses vs. Stephens, 2 Pick. 332.
Gaffney vs. Hayden, 110 Mass. 137. 
Williams vs. Bemis, 108 Mass. 91.
The different forms of general assumpsit are:
(a) Money had and received. —
(b) Money lent.
(c) Goods bargained and sold.
(d) Goods sold and delivered.
(e) Use and occupation.
(f) Work and labor performed. (Quantum Meruit.)
(g) Materials furnished. (Quantum^VilebanL)
(h) Accounting together or account stated.
(i) Account annexed.
If the only count in your writ is upon an account annexed, the 
account annexed must be itemized, otherwise your declaration will 
be bad on demurrer.
Bennett vs. Davis, 62 Me. 544.
Exception.
If two or more articles are sold for a gross sum, or in case the suit 
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is brought to recover an agreed price for two or more articles, and 
not for the sale and delivery of an article.
Milliken vs. Waldron, 89 Me. 394.
Under account annexed by statute in Maine, you may also recover 
for rent due on leases under seal or otherwise, and claims fo« damage’ 
to premises rented. You must specify the nature and amount of 
claim.
Plummer vs. Bowie, 76 Me. 496.
Me. R. S. Chap. 96, Sect. 10.
ACTIONS EX DELICTO*
There are five kinds of actions ex delicto:
1. Trespass.




1. Trespasses an action brought for an injury to the person or_to 
propertya^cFimpHes direct force.
There are three kinds of trespass —x—<— ----—----------,-----L— ,. . . ..
Second, to personal property, called trespass d^bonisasportatis^
2ry/,?to the persom such as assault and battery.
'hircL Trespass to real property, called trespass quare clausum
GyneralRule.
When the injury was not committed by force actual or implied, 
or when the injury was merely consequential, or, when in the case of 
injury to property, the plaintiff’s interest or right at the time of the 
injury was only in remainder or reversion, trespass will not lie, and 
the remedy is an action of trespass on the case.
Adams vs. Hemmenway, 1 Mass. 145.
Exception.
The owner of real property can maintain an action of trespass for 
an unlawful and forcible entry even though at the time the land was 
occupied by his tenant at will.
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Lawry vs. Lawry, 88 Me. 482.
In Maine, by statute, the distinction between trespassand trespass 
pnTGTcase^sTeen abolished,^aqda declaratjonji^thexlQrmja. 
good.
' Me. R. S. Chap. 84, Sect. 26. 
Hathorn vs. Eaton, 70 Me. 219.
I have said that trespass impliesjonx. That force may be pftwQ.
kinds, actual/ implied^
.“Assault and battery, tearing down a fence, breaking into a house, 
/or carrying away goods are examples of actual force.
Fouldes vs. Willoughby, 8 M. & W. 540.
Oa the other hand, if I walk across the land of my neighbor, how; 
everpeaceably, if without permission, it would be a trespass and an
example of implied force.
Daniels vs. Pond, 21 Pick. 367.
Decker vs. Gammon, 44 Me. 322.
The essential allegations are,
(trespass to the person,,)
(1) . The_ injury.
(2) . The damages.
(In trespass to property, real or personal,)
(1) . Possession or right of possession of the property.
Lawry vs. Lawry, 88 Me. 482.
(2) . A description o£the property sufficient to identify it.
(3) . The forcible entryor taking.
(4) . The damages.
2. Trespass^onjthe Case.
This is an action brought for injuries to the person or property 
which are not the result of force actual or implied, or for forcible 
injuries where the matter affected is not of a tangible nature, as for 
example, the obstruction of a right of way, or where the plaintiff’s 
interest in the property was only in reversion, or where the injury 
was not immediate but consequential.
* 1 he essential allegations are,
s^atement of the matter or thing affected, and the plain­
tiff’s right thereto.
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(2) . The injury.
(3) . The damages.
3. Trover.
Trover is an action brought for the recovery of the value of per­
sonal property converted by the defendant in which the plaintiff at 
the time of the conversion had a general or special interest and of 
which he had the possession or the right of possession.
The essential allegations are,
(1) . A description of the property and the plaintiff’s right thereto.
(2) . The conversion by the defendant.
(3) . The damages.
4. Detinue
Detinue is an action to recover specific personal property which 
was or had been in the actual possession of the defendant, and by 
him wrongfully taken or detained, or for the value of such property 
in case it cannot be returned.
This action is practically obsolete in this country, having been 
superseded by the action of replevin.
5. Replevin.
Replevin at common law may be defined to be an action brought 
for the recovery of specific personal property unlawfully taken or 
detained from the owner or the person entitled to the possession, and 
for damages for its detention..
The Revised Statutes of Maine provide in chapter 98, section 8, 
“When goods unlawfully taken or detained from the owner or person 
entitled to the possession thereof, or attached on mesne process, or 
taken on execution, are claimed by any person other than the de­
fendant in the suit in which they were taken or attached, such owner 
or person may cause them to be replevied.”
The essential allegations are,
(1) . Possession or right to immediate possession in the plaintiff.
(2) . A description of the goods sufficient to identify them.
(3) . Unlawful taking or detention by the defendant.
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(4) Allegation that the same are not attached on mesne process 
or taken on execution as the property of the plaintiff.
(5) . The damages.
A demand in replevin is sufficient though made by an officer before 
service of a replevin writ already in his possession.
Webber vs. Read, 65 Me. 564.
O’Neil vs. Bailey, 68 Me. 429.
Sanborn vs. Leavitt, 43 N. H. 472. 
Hines vs. Allen, 55 Me. 114.
. Replevin must be brought against the person in possession of the 
chattel at the time when the suit was commenced, no matter by 
whom the chattel was taken.
Ramsdell vs. Buswell, 54 Me. 546.
The case of Sayward vs. Warren, 27 Me. 453 holds the opposite 
of the above proposition, but has been overruled.
The defendant need not have possession personally. Where the 
chattel is held by an agent or servant for the principal or master, 
the action will lie against the latter.
So it may lie against a firm, one member of which holds the chattel 
for all.
Howe vs. Shaw, 56 Me. 291.
In a case where a demand is necessary, plaintiff is excused from 
proving a demand if the defendant pleads title in himself.
Lewis vs. Smart, 67 Me. 206.
The plea of the general issue in replevin admits the title to be in_ 
the plaintiff and it also admits the capacity of the plaintiff to sue.
For example, if you bring an action in the name of a corporation 
and the defendant pleads the general issue, you are not obliged to 
prove that the plaintiff is a corporation.
If the defendant pleads title in himself and traverses title in the 
plaintiff, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff on the question of 
title.
But if the defendant simply pleads title in himself and does not 
traverse title in the plaintiff, the burden of proof is on him.
Pope vs. Jackson, 65 Me: 162.
i
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GENERAL REQUISITES OF A DECLARATION.
The firsthandjnost important requisite is that all the material facts 
must be alleged, that is, every fact which you must prove to make 
out a prima facie case must be alleged in the declaration.
If the declaration is insufficient, no subsequent allegation in any 
of the later stages of the pleadings will entitle the plaintiff to recover. 




Another essential is that when the right of recovery depends upon. 
condition precedent, the declaration must aver a performance of it.
Concurrent Conditions.
If the condition in a contract is concurrent, as distinguished from 
a condition precedent, the plaintiff need only allege his willingness 
and readiness to perform.
When an actual request is necessary, the general averment that 
“though often requested, etc.” is not sufficient, it being but a matter 
of form and not traversable. A special request should be alleged.
Birks vs. Trippet, 1 Saunders Reports, 33 (note 2);s. c. 85 Engl. 
Reprint, 37.
It seems to make a difference whether the duty resting on the de­
fendant is created by law or by contract. If it_is created by law, no 
request is necessary, but where the duty is created by contract^ 
and the express terms of the contract make the request a condition 
precedent, then it must be specia 11 y allegccL
Conditions Subsequent.
Conditions subsequent need not be set out in the declaration and 
the “reason is that they do not create the right of action, but, on the 
other hand, qualify or defeat ijL
IT'the defendant has performed the condition, it is a matter of 
defense for him to plead.
For example, in a suit on a bond, you simply declare on the penal 
part of the bond, taking no notice of the condition in it. If the de­
fendant has performed the condition, he should plead it as a defense.
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In declaring on a deed or written instrument, you need only set 
out as much ol it as you rely upon, provided it makes out a prim a facie 
case; but 11 There is an exception in the body of the contract it must 
be set out and the subject matter of the exception excluded from 
the breach assigned.
When A covenants with B to convey a farm with the exception of 
a part of it, in declaring upon this covenant, you must state the 
exception not only in that part of the declaration describing the 
covenant, but also in that part assigning the breach; that is, you 
should allege that A has not conveyed the farm with the exception 
of that particular part.
The reason for this is, that if the exception were not set out in the 
description of the covenant, it would work a variance, and if omitted 
in the assignment of the breach, no breach within the terms of the 
covenant would appear, since all the land not embraced in the 
exception might have been conveyed consistently with the truth of 
the breach assigned.
f On the other hand, a separate proviso need not be set out in the 
declaration.
For example, if A covenants with B to convey a farm, with the 
separate proviso that on A’s performing a certain act, he should not 
be bound to convey a certain part of it, B, in declaring on the 
covenant, need not take notice of the proviso, for it does not enter 
into the description of the covenanting clause but is in the nature 
of a condition subsequent, of which advantage may be taken by way 
of defense.
Penal Statutes*
In declaring upon penal statutes, if there is an exception in the 
enacting or prohibitory clause of the act, it must be excluded by 
averment in the declaration, but any proviso or qualification in a 
separate and substantive clause need not be taken notice of in the 
declaration.
In the first instance, it is a part of the description of the offense 
itself, while, in the latter case, it amounts to an excuse or defense for 
the defendant.
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In a declaration on a penal statute, you must allege that the act 
was contrary to the form of the statute, either in those words or in 
others oTequivalent import.
Penley vs. Whitney, 48 Me. 351.
In actions for injuries caused by force, such as assault and battery, 
trespass, or false imprisonment, you must allege that the act was 
committed vi et ar mis, and also against the peace of the state, or 
your declaration will be bad on special demurrer.
Saunders’ Reports, 81, 82, (note 1.)
Contracts in writing and under the Statute of Frauds.
The next requisite of a declaration is that in actions upon contracts 
required by common law to be under seal, it must be alleged in the 
declaration thatjhgyjyere by deed or under seal.
But in an action upon a contract which is valid at common law 
without a writing, but which some statute requires to be in writing, 
as the statute of frauds, plaintiff need not allege in liTs declaration 
that the contract is in writing^
The statute of frauds introduces a new rule of evidence, but does 
not alter or affect the manner of pleading the facts.
If, to a declaration on a contract within the statute of frauds, 
defendant demurs, the demurrer admits the promise to be in writing, 
though it was not alleged in the declaration to be so. The reason 
is that if the defendant demurs, he confesses the promise, and thus 
precludes the plaintiff from proving it; and therefore it must have 
been intended by the defendant to admit a promise which the plaintiff 
had means of proving by legal evidence.
It should be remembered, however, that if a contract within the 
statute of frauds is pleaded in defense to an action, the plea must 
show that the contract is in writing, as required by the statute
The reason for this is that the plea being in confession and avoid­
ance, confesses a good cause of action, and if the defendant seeks to 
avoid liability on the ground that the plaintiff has accepted a new 
contract as a substitute for the original contract, for example, the 
plea must show that the contract accepted was one which the plaintiff 
could enforce.
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1 Saunders’ Reports, 276 a (note 2).
When a contract or conveyance unknown to the common law is 
created by a statute and required by statute to be in writing it must 
be alleged in the declaration that it is in writing, and also in any other 
stage of the pleadings. An example would be a devise of real estate.
Allegations of Time*
The next requisite of the declaration is the allegation of time.
The time of every traversable fact mustbe stated in the declaration; 
that is, it must be alleged that it occurred on a certain day, month, and 
year.
This rule holds good not only in regard to the declaration, but also 
as to all other stages of the pleadings.
Gilmore vs. Mathews, 67 Me. 517.
Shorey vs. Chandler, 80 Me. 409. General demurrer sufficient. 
Wellington vs. Milliken, 82 Me. 58.
Platt vs. Jones, 59 Me. 232.
You need not prove the timefas alleged unless it constitutes a 
material part of the contract or instrument declared on, or unless 
you are describing the date of a written contract or instrument.
Ripley vs. Hebron, 60 Me. 379.
Time is sometimes made material by the subsequent pleadings.
It the plaintiff alleges a promise more than six years prior to the 
date of the writ, and the defendant pleads the statute of limitations, 
the plaintiff in his replication may set forth a promise within six 
years before the suit was brought.
When the time alleged is not material, but is made so by the de­
fendant’s plea, plaintiff may reply a different time and it will not be 
a departure or a deviation from what was material in the prior plead­
ing.
This is true also in all of the subsequent stages of the pleadings. 
Little vs. Blunt, 16 Pick. 359.
2 Saunders’ Reports, 5 ab (note 3).
If time is not material in the declaration, the defendant in his plea 
must follow the time as alleged, even though it is not the true time.
Tor example, in an action for an assault and battery, the time 
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alleged in the declaration is May 3, 1898. Defendant claimed that 
the act was committed in self defense. Both the assault and the 
self defense must be alleged to have occurred on May 3, 1898.
1 Saunders’ Reports, 82, (note 3).
Exception 1.
If the justification set up by the defendant in his plea is such as to 
render it necessary to his defence that the true time be stated in his 
plea, then time becomes material and the defendant not only may 
but he must state the true time, though it varies from the time 
alleged in the declaration.
For example, in an action for trespass de bonis against an officer, 
the defence is justification by taking the goods in question on a legal 
precept issued and dated subsequent to the day on which the trespass 
was alleged to have been committed. In this case, the defendant 
may do one of two things.11 He may allege the true time in his plea and traverse any trespass 
on all other days.
1 Chitty on Pleading, 534.
t Or he may allege that the trespass declared on in the declaration 
and the one described in the plea are one and the same.
1 Saunders’ Reports, 298, (note 2).
1 Saunders’ Reports, 82, (note 3).
Exception II.
If the defence pleaded be a discharge of a previously existing 
liability, as a release or payment, defendant is never obliged to follow 
the day mentioned in the writ, even if time be material, for a devia­
tion in a plea of this sort produces no apparent variance upon the 
record in regard to time, since all matters of discharge must neces­
sarily have accrued subsequently to the creation of the debt or 
liability declared on.
1 Chitty on Pleading, 517.
If the plaintiff alleges that the act of which, he complains occurred 
on a single day only, he can recover for the acts of some one day only.
If the acts of trespass complained of are separate and distinct acts 
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but are committed on a series of consecutive days, you can do ong 
oftwo things.
! You can bring as many actions as there are trespasses or you can 
recover for all the trespasses in one action.
In the latter case, you allege the acts to have been committed on 
*a certain day and on divers days and times from that day to the 
day of the date of the wrilL_
An example of such trespasses would be the acts of defendant in 
cutting lumber on the plaintiff’s land on successive days.
If the acts, though committed on successive days, are of such a 
nature that the trespasses of one day cannot be distinguished from 
those of the succeeding day, that is, if the trespasses are in reality 
a continuous act, the time of the trespass in your declaration should 
be laid with a continuando; that is, that the defendant on a certain 
day and continuously from that day to another certain day com­
mitted the acts in question.
An example of a continuing trespass would be the acts of the de­
fendant’s cattle in unlawfully entering and remaining in plaintiff’s 
field for a number of successive days.
2 Chitty on Pleading, 367.
3 Blackstone’s Comm. 212.
1 Saunders’ Reports, 23, (note 1.)
A declaration alleging the acts to have been committed on divers 
days and times between two certain days is bad on demurrer;. It 
should allege them to have been committed on a certain day and on 
divers days and times between that day and another certain day.
If the acts are laid on divers days and times or with a contiuando, 
you are confined in your evidence to the period of time covered by 
the declaration even though time is not material, for the con­
tinuando or words “on divers days and times” are regarded as de­
scriptive of the alleged trespasses or at least of the manner in which 
they were committed.
Pierce vs. Pickens, 16 Mass. 470.
1 Saunders’, 24, (note).
If you find that the act committed did not occur within the time 
set forth in the declaration, you should move to amend the declara­
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tion by striking out the continuando or the words “on divers days 
and times” and leaving the simple allegation of the acts of a single 
day. Then you can recover for all the acts of any single day 
within the period fixed by the statute of limitations.
Pierce vs. Pickens, supra.
If, when time is not material, the plaintiff states an impossible. 
dayTa^theBOth of February, or a day future to that of the pleading, 
or an inconsistent day, as where in trover the loss is alleged on the 
tenth day of May and the finding or conversion on the fifth of the 
same May, theeffect is the same as if no time had been alleged, a de- 
murrer will lie.
Allegations in Regard to Place and the^Law of Venue.
It is a general rule of the common law that some certain place 
must be alleged at which every material and traversable fact occurred.
This is usually done by designating the town or city, county, and 
state m which the act is alleged to have occurred.
Sometimes it is necessary to state the truejfiace, and when it is 
the place laidTmust be proved.
Sometimes it is not necessary to allege any place at all.
The question when the true place must be, and when it need not
be alleged gives rise to the divisions of actions into two classes, 
ZocaZand transitory.
Local actions are_ those which must be brought in the county




(c) Trespass to real property^
(d) rX,:„.
(e) Waste at. common law.
Transitory actions a,re those which follow The person and at 
common law may be brought in any^ county in the state,.
The transitory actions are
(a) Personal trespass..






Transitory actions are more or less limited in the different states 
by statutes; therefore you should be very careful to examine the 
statute before bringing your action.
Tn local actions, it should be borne in mind that not only some 
place must be alleged for every material fact, but also that the true 
place must be alleged.
In transitory actions, though at common law you need allege a 
place at which every material fact occurred, you need not allege the 
true place nor need the proof correspond to the place alleged.
All actions for the recovery of seisin or the possession of real estate 
must be brought in the county where the land lies, though neither 
plaintiff nor defendant live in that county.
Also, these actions must be tried in the county where they are 
commenced, even though, after suit is brought, the town where the 
land lies is set off and annexed to another county.
Blake vs. Freeman, 13 Me. 130.
The action of replevin must be brought in the county in which the 
original taking was or where the chattel is detained.
Pease vs. Simpson, 12 Me. 261.
In local actions, wrong venue or want of venue can be taken ad­
vantage of by plea in abatement or under the general issue or, if 
apparent on the face of the record, by demurrer.
Hathorne vs. Haines, 1 Me. 238.
Blake vs. Freeman, 13 Me. 130.
In transitory actions, great particularity in laying venue was never 
required in this state.
Names of towns and cities and their locations are part of the public 
law of which the court will take judicial notice.
It has been held that to name a town without naming the county 
is sufficient even in criminal actions, as well as in civil.
Martin vs. Martin, 51 Me. 366.
State vs. Simpson, 91 Me. 83.
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Or to name the county without naming the town.
Bacon’s Abridgement, Venue. ►
Or to name the town and county without naming the state.
1 Bishop’s Crim. Prac. 383.
Commonwealth vs. Quin, 5 Gray, 478.
It is no longer necessary to allege a venue in transitory actions in 
Maine, Massachusetts, or England.
Blackstone Bank vs. Lane, 80 Me. 165.
Rule of Court XLV, 24 Pick. 398.
Joinder and Misjoinder of Causes of Action.
The general rule is that when several causes of action accruing 
between the same parties in the same capacity all require not only 
the same judgment at common law, but also the same general issue, 
all may be joined in one action.
2 Saunders’ Reports, 117 c; 85 Engl. Reprint, 828.
Exception.
An action of debt on a bond cannot be joined with an action of 
covenant broken although the general issue is the same in both cases 
and both require the same kind of judgment at common law.
1 Chitty on Pleading, 199.
Actions of tort cannot be joined with actions of contract for they 
require not only different judgments but also different general issues. 
Church vs. Mumford, 11 Johnson, 479.
Crooker vs. Willard, 28 N. H. 134.
Stoyel vs. Wescott, 2 Day (Conn.) 418.
By the common law of England, when a recovery was secured in 
an action against the defendant for a forcible wrong, i. e., committed 
vi et armis, the defendant was obliged to pay a fine to the king for 
the breach of the peace thereby occasioned, and the judgment of 
capiatur pro fine was rendered against him, on which he could be 
arrested and imprisoned.
But if the declaration did not allege that the wrong was committed 
in et ar mis, the judgment of capiatur could not be rendered but a 
judgment called misericordia was given.
3 Blackstone’s Comm. 398.
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Based upon this distinction between these two judgments, it is 
held that actions for forcible injuries cannot be joined with actions 
for injuries not alleged to have been committed vi et armis, because, 
as just seen, they formerly required different judgments.
For this reason, at common law, a count for trespass cannot be 
joined with a count for trespass on the case even when the latter 
arises ex delicto.
Therefore assault and battery, false imprisonment, or trespass to 
property of any kind, cannot be joined with trover, slander, fraud, 
malicious prosecution, negligence, or any other wrong unaccompanied 
by force, for although all of these require the same general issue, 
that is, not guilty, the first mentioned require the judgment of 
capiatur, while the second require the judgment of misericordia.
2 Saunders’ Reports, 117 e, note; 85 Engl. Reprint, 832.
A joinder of different demands is never allowed when it would 
cause a blending of different forms of action, even though the same 
form of judgment would be adapted to them all.
Therefore debt, covenant, and assumpsit cannot be joined in one 
action nor can either of them be joined with either of the others, 
although they are all actions ex contractu, and require the same kind 
of judgment at common law, that is, misericordia; for each requires 
a different general issue and as the forms of action adapted to them 
are essentially different, the joinder would tend to perplexity and 
confusion, which the law always seeks to avoid.
1 Chitty on Pleading, 199.
Because different actions require different general issues, it does 
not necessarily follow that they cannot be joined.
Debt on a judgment, debt on a specialty, and debt on a simple 
contract may all be joined in one action although the general issue 
in the first is nul tiel record, in the second is non est factum, and in 
the third is nil debet, for they all require the same kind of judgment, 
misericordia.
1 Saunders’ Reports, 117 b, note 2; 85 Engl. Reprint, 829. 
Union Mfg. Co. vs. Lobdell, 13 Johnson, 462.
The court in this state has said, “With respect to the joinder of 
actions, one sure test of propriety is, can the same plea be pleaded, 
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and the same kind of judgment rendered on both; if yes, the joinder 
is proper.”
Allen vs. Ham, 63 Me. 532.
How to Take Advantage of Misjoinder of Causes of Action*
By the common law of England, the joinder of causes of action 
which the law did not allow to be joined could be taken advantage 
of by demurrer, or after verdict by a motion in arrest of judgment, 
or by a writ of error.
Bacon’s Abridgment, Pleas B, 3.
I Term Reports, 274; s. c. 99 Engl. Reprint, 1091.
1 Henry Blackstone, 108; s. c. 126 Engl. Reprint, 65.
In Maine, misjoinder of causes of action or counts can be taken 
advantage of by special demurrer only.
Nat’l Bank vs. Abell, 63 Me. 346.
The reason for requiring a special demurrer in this state is that in 
case there were two or more counts in the declaration and the same 
were not properly joined, if one count is held good, a general demurrer 
would be overruled.
Blanchard vs. Hoxie, 34 Me. 376.
VI* DILATORY PLEAS*
A dilatory plea is neither a traverse, which denies the cause of 
action directly, nor a plea of confession and avoidance, which denies 
the cause of action indirectly, nor a demurrer, which admits the facts 
alleged in the declaration, but a plea which offers some excuse for 
not pleading to the merits of the case; the effect of such a plea is to 
defeat the plaintiff’s present, but not ultimate, right of recovery.
Dilatory Pleas are of three classes:
1. Pleas to the jurisdiction of the court.
2. Pleas to the disability of the parties.
3. Pleas in abatement.
The order in which these pleas are named is important, because 
by pleading a plea of one class, you waive your right to file a plea of 
the preceding class; but you may file a plea of each class if you do 
so in the order named and within the time required by the rules of 
court for filing dilatory pleas.
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A defendant cannot simultaneously plead two dilatory pleas to 
the same action, for such pleading would not only be double, which 
is not allowed, but also the subsequent plea would be a waiver of the 
first.
Bacon’s Abridgment, Abatement, Section O.
A defendant may however plead at the same time two different 
dilatory pleas, either of the same or of a different nature, to different 
defects, for that would not constitute duplicity.
L PLEAS TO THE JURISDICTION.
A plea to the jurisdiction is a plea which denies the right of the 
court to hear and decide the case.
If the defendant desires to plead to the jurisdiction, he must 
appear in person, and not by attorney, within the time allowed by the 
rules of court, which in this state is within the first two days of the 
return term.
By pleading any other plea or by appearing by an attorney, who 
is an officer of the court, it is held that the defendant admits that the 
court has jurisdiction and all objection to it is waived.
Carlisle vs. Weston, 21 Pick. 535.
Guild vs. Richardson, 6 Pick. 364.
Rules of Court, 103 Me. 519.
Lack of jurisdiction is of two kinds, inherent and lack of which 
the defendant can take advantage.
If there is an inherent lack of jurisdiction, as where a suit in 
admiralty is brought before a common law court, nothing that the 
defendant can do will give the court jurisdiction. The court will 
dismiss the action ex officio, for the whole proceeding will be utterly 
void.
Comm. vs. Johnson, 8 Mass. 87.
If the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit, but 
not over the parties, as where an action is brought in the wrong 
county, the defendant can confer jurisdiction upon the court by 
consent, as where he appears by attorney.
In a transitory action, wrong venue must be taken advantage of 
by a plea to the jurisdiction, or if it appears on the face of the record, 
by a motion to dismiss the action.
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Demuth vs. Cutler, 50 Me. 298.
Mansur vs. Coffin, 54 Me. 314.
MODE OF PLEADING TO THE JURISDICTION.
There is an essential difference in the mode of pleading to the 
jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction, like our Supreme Judi­
cial Court, and one of limited jurisdiction like a municipal court.
In a court of general jurisdiction, it is not enough to plead negative­
ly that the court has no jurisdiction, but you must go further and 
point out specifically some other court which has jurisdiction. For 
if it does not appear that a remedy can be had in some other tribunal 
that very fact will confer jurisdiction upon a court of general juris­
diction.
In courts of limited jurisdiction, you need not point out in your 
plea what court does have jurisdiction.
Gould on Pleading, 222 (5th ed.)
Rea vs. Hayden, 3 Mass. 24.
A plea to the jurisdiction concludes by praying judgment if the 
court will take cognizance of the suit, or in technical language, “of 
the plea aforesaid.”
3 Blackstone’s Comm. 308.
2 Chitty on Pleading, 412.
2. PLEAS TO THE DISABILITY OF THE PARTIES.




(d) That the person named as plaintiff never existed, or having 
once existed, had ceased to exist at the commencement of the suit.
(a) Alienage. *
It is a general rule that alien enemies cannot maintain an action 
in their own right or even in the right of another, as an executor or 
administrator, and this may be pleaded in bar as well as by a plea 
to the disability of the parties.
When the disability is removed, the right of action revives, so 
the effect is to suspend, rather than to defeat it.
DILATORY PLEAS 57
2 Chitty on Pleading, 425. '
Parkinson vs. Wentworth, 11 Mass. 26. 
Hutchinson vs. Brock, 11 Mass. 119.
Exception.
An alien enemy under a license or letters of protection for safe 
conduct can maintain actions, for he stands on the same footing as 
an alien friend.
8 Term Reports, 166; s. c. 101 Engl. Reprint, 1325.
Clarke vs. Morey, 10 Johnson, 69.
An alien friend, being under the protection of the law, can generally 
maintain an action in his own right, either in his individual capacity 
or his representative capacity, except so far as legal incapacity pre­
vents him.
By the common law both of England and of this country, he can­
not hold real estate, but in Maine by statute, he can take, hold, 
convey, and devise real property or any interest therein and such 
conveyances to or by an alien are valid.
Me. R. S. Chap. 75, Sect. 2.
(b) Coverture*
That a married woman was sued alone without the joinder of her 
husband was pleadable to her disability at common law.
Hayden vs. Attleborough, 7 Gray, 338.
In Maine by statute, a married woman can maintain actions in 
her own name with or without the joinder of her husband at her 
option.
Me. R. S. Chap. 63, Sect. 5.
(c) Infancy*
If a person under twenty-one years of age brings an action in his 
own name, it is pleadable to his disability in abatement.
Infancy of the plaintiff can be taken advantage of in no other way. 
Smith vs. Carney, 127 Mass. 179.
McMullin vs. McMullin, 92 Me. 338.
The reason why an infant cannot maintain an action in his own 
name is because he cannot appear in person on account of his want 
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of judgment to conduct a suit, nor by attorney on account of his 
legal incapacity to appoint one.
The action should be brought in the name of the infant’s next 
friend.
At common law, where an infant sues as co-executor with an 
adult, both may appear by attorney, for, as the rights and property 
of the infant are not affected by the suit, he acting in his representa­
tive capacity only, the adult is permitted to appoint an attorney for 
both.
2 Saunders’ Reports 212; s. c. 85 Engl. Reprint, 1009.
(d) That the Plaintiff Never Existed or is Dead.
That the action is brought in the name of a person who never 
existed is good ground for a plea to the disability of the parties, for 
in such case there is in fact no plaintiff.
1 Chitty on Pleading, 448.
Doe vs. Penfield, 19 Johnson, 308.
Boston Foundry vs. Spooner, 5 Vt. 93.
It is probably also a good plea in bar, for that a right of action 
should exist in favor of an imaginary person is clearly wrong.
Where a suit is brought in the name of a person who once actually 
lived but who at the time of the commencement of the suit was dead, 
a plea that the plaintiff was not in esse at the date of the writ is bad; 
the proper plea being that the plaintiff was dead at the time.
This diversity in the forms of pleading seems intended merely to 
mark the difference between the case of a person named as a plaintiff 
after he is dead and the case where an imaginary person is named.
Pleas to the disability of the plaintiff should conclude by praying 
judgment “if the said John Smith ought to be answered,” or, when 
the disability operates only as a temporary suspension of the suit, 
“that the plaint may remain sine die11 f that is, that it may be dropped 
until the disability be removed.
3 Blackstone’s Comm. 303.
3. PLEAS IN ABATEMENT.
9 Pleas in abatement are those pleas which abate or destroy the 
writ without destroying the cause of action.
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If a defect which is a cause of abatement only does not appear on 
the face of the record, it must be pleaded in abatement. If it is 
apparent on the face of the record, advantage may be taken either 
by a plea in abatement or a motion to dismiss the action.
Chamberlain vs. Lake, 36 Me. 388.
Badger vs. Towle, 48 Me. 20. 
Billings vs. Berry, 50 Me. 31.
The law does not favor pleas in abatement and they should be 
pleaded with great precision and certainty.
Hazzard vs. Haskell, 27 Me. 549.
Burnham vs. Howard, 31 Me. 569.
CAUSES OR GROUND OF ABATEMENT.
(a) Misnomer.
(b) Death of the parties at common law.
(c) Nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties.
(d) Variance.
(e) Pendency of prior suit for the same cause.
(f) Defects in the service of the writ.
(g) In Maine, certain defenses to writs of entry, petitions for 
partition, and formerly actions of dower.
(h) Any defect, unauthorized change, or irregularity in the writ 
or process.
(a) Misnomer.
All the parties to a suit should be identified by their full Christian 
names and also their surnames.
A mistake in the name of either party to a suit can be taken ad­
vantage of only by a plea in abatement. It cannot be objected to 
on the ground of a variance between the declaration and the proof. 
Baker vs. Bessey, 73 Me. 472.
This is true in criminal as well as in civil actions.
State vs. Knowlton, 70 Me. 200.
It is otherwise, however, in the case of a person not a party to the 
suit.
Mistakes in the names of such persons can be taken advantage of 
on the ground of a variance.
Perry on Pleading, 340.
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The greatest care must be exercised in pleading misnomer. The 
plea must be direct and positive and not argumentative. It is safer 
to have your client plead in person.
1 Chitty on Pleading, 457.
Will the plea by attorney be bad? There are cases both ways.
2 Saunders’ Reports, 209 b; 85 Engl. Reprint, 997.
You must be careful in pleading misnomer not to call your client 
by the name given him in the writ. If you do, you will be estopped 
from denying that that is his true name. If A is sued by the 
name of B and he in his plea says, “and now the said B comes and 
defends, etc.,” the plea would be bad. The plea should say, “and 
now A, against whom the plaintiff has sued out his writ in the name 
of B, comes and defends, etc.”
2 Saunders’ Reports, 209 b; 85 Engl. Reprint, 999.
In pleading misnomer, the defendant should give his full middle 
name. Giving the initial is not sufficient.
State vs. Homer, 40 Me. 438.
Commonwealth vs. Perkins, 1 Pick. 388.
If the person pleading the misnomer has no middle name but only 
a letter instead, that fact should be stated in the plea.
Of course a plea giving only the initials of both his middle and 
Christian names would be bad.
Davis vs. Philbrick, 87 Me. 196.
The plea should also state the full surname. If it omits the full 
surname, as where John G. Smith in his plea says that his name is 
“John G. and not John J. Smith,” the plea is bad.
2 Saunders’ Reports, 209, a & b note; 85 Engl. Reprint, 998. 
Haworth vs. Spraggs, 8 Term Reports, 515; s. c. 101 Engl. 
Reprint, 1521.
It is a good reply to a plea of misnomer that at the time of the 
commencement of the suit, the defendant was as well known by 
the name by which he was sued as by his true name.
Frye vs. Hinkley, 18 Me. 320.
2 Chitty on Pleading, 590.
This is true even in criminal cases.
State vs. Corkrey, 64 Me. 521.
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(b) Death of the Parties at Common Law.
At common law, the death of a sole plaintiff or defendant or one of 
•several co-plaintiffs abated the suit.
Bacon’s Abridgement, Abatement, F.
In this state, by statute, when a party dies, if the cause of action 
survives, his death may be suggested on the record, and his personal 
representative may voluntarily become a party to the suit, or he 
may at the request of the other party to the suit be summoned in 
and made a party. If he does not appear after being summoned, 
judgment may be entered against him, either a default or a nonsuit, 
as the case may require. A judgment against the survivors and 
against the goods and estate of the deceased in the hands of the 
personal representatives may be rendered.
Me R. S. Chap. 84, Sect. 51.
Me. R. S. Chap. 89, Sect. 12.
(c) Nonjoinder or Misjoinder of Parties.
See Parties to Actions.
(d) Variance.
Any variance between the declaration and the writ or between the 
writ or declaration and the instrument declared on, may be taken 
advantage of by a plea in abatement.
If the variance is a mere matter of form, advantage can be taken 
only by a plea in abatement, but if the variance is a matter of sub­
stance, it can be taken advantage of under the general issue.
5th ed. Gould on Pleading, 251.
(e) Pendency of a Prior Suit for the Same Cause.
The pendency of another action for the same cause between the 
same parties at the time the second action is commenced, in a court 
having jurisdiction, is a good ground of abatement, but it can be 
taken advantage of only in abatement.
Small vs. Thurlow, 37 Me. 504.
The reason for this is that the law abhors a multiplicity of suits 
and will not permit a man to be harassed by two suits for the same 
cause.
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It is not necessary that the two suits be of the same kind; it is 
enough that they are for the same cause of action; as trespass de 
bonis and trover to recover the value of the same chattel, or trover 
and replevin for the same taking.
Bacon’s Abridgment, Abatement, M.
But the court must have jurisdiction of the prior action.
If the prior action is in an inferior court, that is, a court of limited 
jurisdiction, you should allege in your plea that the court has juris­
diction of the action.
Exception.
If a contract is joint and several, a person entering into it makes 
himself liable jointly and severally and therefore renders himself 
liable by consent to two actions for the same cause and both can be 
carried on at the same time.
Turner vs. Whitmore, 63 Me. 526.
The defendant should enroll in or with his plea a record of the 
process upon which he relies. It then becomes a part of the plea 
and affords a means by which the court is enabled to determine the 
truth of the plea by inspection.
Turner vs. Whitmore, supra.
(f) Defects in the Service of the Writ.
If the return of the service of the writ by the officer is defective, 
it must be taken advantage of, if at all, either by a plea in abatement 
or a motion to dismiss.
If the defect is apparent on inspection, it can be taken advantage 
of either by the plea or by the motion; but if it is not apparent, the 
plea is the only remedy.
Richardson vs. Rich, 66 Me. 249.
Defendant should appear specially and file either the plea or the 
motion within the first two days of the return term.
If he appears generally, it cures all defects in the service, even 
lack of service.
If it appears on inspection that there has been no service and the 
defendant has not waived the same, the court will dismiss the action 
ex officio.
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Cook vs. Lothrop, 18 Me. 260.
Shaw vs. Usher, 41 Me. 102.
Mace vs. Woodward, 38 Me. 426.
If the officer’s return shows a good service, you can not plead 
in abatement a defective service, even though as a matter of fact 
there has been no service at all. The officer’s return as between the 
parties to the suit is conclusive and cannot be controverted. The 
only remedy is a suit against the officer for a false return.
Stinson vs. Snow, 10 Me. 263.
(g) In Maine, Certain Defences to Writs of Entry, Etc.
I. Writs of Entry.
(а) Disseisin by Ancestor.
In a writ of entry, when the disseisin was committed by the de­
fendant’s ancestor, it must be pleaded in abatement.
Porter vs. Cole, 4 Me. 20.
Gordan vs. Peirce, 11 Me. 213.
(б) N on-Tenure.
That the defendant was not a tenant of the freehold must be plead­
ed in abatement or under a brief statement within the time allowed 
for filing pleas in abatement, unless the time is extended by the court. 
Me. R. S. Chap. 106, Sect. 6.
Fogg vs. Fogg, 31 Me. 302.
Manning vs. Laboree, 33 Me. 343. 
Wyman vs. Brown, 50 Me. 139.
II. Petitions For Partition.
In such petitions, the inability or incapacity of the petitioner may 
be taken advantage of only by a plea in abatement.
Upham vs. Bradley, 17 Me. 423.
Blaisdell vs. Pray, 68 Me. 269.
III. Formerly Actions of Dower.
The objection that it did not appear that the defendant was tenant 
of the freehold at the time the action was commenced could be made 
only under a plea in abatement.
Me. R. S. Chap. 105, Sect. 4.
Lewis vs. Meserve, 61 Me. 374.
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(h) Any Defect or Change in the Writ of Process.
If these defects are not apparent on the face of the record, they 
can be taken advantage of only by a plea in abatement.
Chamberlain vs. Lake, 36 Me. 388.
Where there is no return day in the writ or an erroneous one, the 
defect may be taken advantage of by a plea in abatement or a 
motion to dismiss the action.
Pattee vs. Low, 36 Me. 138.
A mistake in the residence of a party must be taken advantage of 
by a plea in abatement.
Mahan vs. Sutherland, 73 Me. 158.
An unauthorized change in the writ after service must be taken 
advantage cf either by a plea in abatement or a motion to dismiss.
Bray vs. Libby, 71 Me. 276.
Dodge vs. Hunter, 85 Me. 121.
That a replevin bond was not double the value of the goods, or 
was executed by one surety only, should be taken advantage of by 
a plea in abatement.
Douglass vs. Gardner, 63 Me. 462.
Greely vs. Currier, 39 Me. 516.
MODE AND EFFECT OF PLEADING IN ABATEMENT.
I. MODE.
One important rule in regard to pleading in abatement is that the 
defendant in his plea must give the plaintiff a better writ; that is, 
he must set out sufficient facts to enable the plaintiff, in a second suit 
for the same cause, to avoid the same defects.
This applies to facts only and not to the law governing the case. 
Brown vs. Gordon, 1 Me. 165.
Defendant must in his plea anticipate all such matters as, if alleged 
on the other side, could defeat his plea.
Therefore, a plea of the nonjoinder of a plaintiff was held fatally 
defective that did not allege that the co-plaintiff, who was not 
joined, was alive, and a resident of the state at the date of the writ.
Furbish vs. Robertson, 67 Me. 35.
Abbreviations should not be used in pleas in abatement.
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The abbreviation judg. for judgment was held to render a plea 
fatally defective.
Cassidy vs. Holbrook, 81 Me. 589.
Beginning and Conclusion of Pleas in Abatement.
If the matter pleaded is apparent on the face of the record, the 
plea should both commence and conclude by praying judgment of 
the writ and declaration.
Otherwise the plea should conclude, but not begin, by praying 
judgment of the writ and declaration. x
Cassidy vs. Holbrook, supra. S' I
By Rule VI of the Supreme Judicial Court (103 Maine) pleas and 
motions in abatement must be filed within the first two days of the 
return term, the day of entry being reckoned as one; if matter of 
fact not apparent on the face of the record is pleaded, it must be 
verified by affidavit. If there is no affidavit or a defective one, the 
plea is bad on demurrer.
Bellamy vs. Oliver, 65 Me. 108.
The affidavit may be made by defendant’s agent or attorney. 
Atwood vs. Higgins, 76 Me. 423.
How to Distinguish Whether a Plea is in Abatement or in Bar.
The beginning and conclusion of any given plea determines whether 
it is in abatement or in bar, for if a plea both begins and concludes 
in abatement, it is a plea in abatement, even though the matter 
pleaded is in bar.
If it both begins and concludes in bar, it is a plea in bar, even 
though the matter pleaded is in abatement.
2 Saunders’ Reports, 209 cd, note 1; 85 Engl. Reprint, 1000.
1 Chitty on Pleading, 446, 456-7.
If the beginning and conclusion differ and the subject matter goes 
either in abatement or in bar, the plaintiff may treat the plea as 
either at his option.
Bacon’s Abridgment, Abatement, P.
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2* EFFECT OF PLEAS IN ABATEMENT OR JUDGMENTS ON DILATORY 
PLEAS,
Judgments in Favor of Plaintiff*
If an issue of fact is joined on a dilatory plea, and found in favor 
of the plaintiff, the judgment is final; that is, recuperet^
Frye vs. Hinkley, 18 Me. 329.
2 Saunders’ Reports, 211, (note 3); 85 Engl. Reprint, 1008. 
Good vs. Lehan, 8 Cush. 301.
Exception.
? In indictments for capital offences, if an issue of fact is joined 
upon a dilatory plea and found in favor of the state, the judgment 
is respondeat ouster, (in favorem vitae). .
2 Hawkins’ Crown Pleas, 23, section 128.
The King vs. Gibson, 8 East, 107;s. c. 103 Engl. Reprint, 284.
There is no exception to the rule in civil pleading and only in 
criminal when the offence charged is a capital one.
If an issue of law is raised upon a dilatory plea, as where the 
plaintiff demurs to the plea, and it is found in favor of the plaintiff, 
the judgment is respondeat ouster, that is, that the defendant plead 
over again.
In Maine, exceptions to the overruling of a dilatory plea should not 
be taken to the law court until after trial on the merits; otherwise 
the defendant is held to have waived his right to plead over.
Me. R. S. Chap. 79, Sect. 56. .
Smith vs. Hunt, 91 Me. 572. ‘
Judgments in Favor of the Defendant*
If an issue either.of Jaw or fact upon a dilatory plea is found in 
favor of the defendant, the judgment is not final but is merely that 
the writ be quashed._
This judgment ends the present suit but does not terminate the 
cause of action.
Sometimes the defect can be remedied by amendment at the 
discretion of the court.
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VII. PLEASJN BAR.
Pleas in bar are of two kinds and may be divided thus:
I. TRAVERSES^
Traverses are of three kinds, general, specific and special.
A general traverse denies all the material facts alleged on the other 
side.
A specific traverse denies some one particular material fact alleged 
on the other side and is now seldom if ever used.
1 Chitty on Pleading, 473.
A special traverse consists of a statement of new matter amounting 
to an argumentative denial of facts already alleged, as an affirmative 
inducement to a specific traverse of some allegation in the pleading 
opposed to it. It consists of an affirmative not compatible with the 
adversary’s former pleading, and a negative in direct contradiction 
to it. It must not consist of a direct denial, nor be in the nature of 
confession and avoidance. Practically obsolete.
Pox vs. Nathans, 32 Conn. 348.
Smith vs. Prazier, 53 Pa. St. 226.
Day vs. Essex Co. Bk., 13 Vt. 97. 
State vs. Chrisman, 2 Ind. 130.
The affirmative part of the traverse is called the inducement and 
the negative part the absque hoc (without this).
II. PLEAS IN CONFESSION AND AVOIDANCE.__
These are pleas which admit the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations 
but avoid their legal effect by affirmatively alleging other and in­
consistent facts.
They are of two classes.
In justification and excuse, which claims to show that the plaintiff 
never at any time had a good cause of action either by reason of 
some legal right of defendant, justifying his conduct in point of law, 
or conduct on the part of plaintiff excusing the defendant from 
liability in this particular case.
Smart vs. Hyde, 8 M. & W. 723.
Briggs vs. Mason, 31^Vt. 433.
68 LECTURES ON COMMON LAW PLEADING
Or pleas in discharge, which admit that the plaintiff once had a 
right of action but show that it is released by some matter subse­
quent, either of law or fact.
Examples, pleas of a release, a tender, bankruptcy, set-off, and the 
statute of limitations.
Eavestaff vs. Russell, 10 M. & W. 365.
McAllister vs. Reab, 4 Wend. 483.
Pleas in confession and avoidance can be set up in Maine under a 
brief statement with the general issue.
Me. R. S. Chap. 84, Sect. 34.
THE GENERAL ISSUE.
The plea of the general issue denies every material allegation in 
the declaration and, either alone or with a brief statement, is the 
plea almost universally used in this state.
I will now give you the general issues in the different actions and 
what may be shown under them.
The general issue in assumpsit is non assumpsit.
Under this the defendant may show anything tending to deny 
his liability, with five exceptions:




5. In Maine and Massachusetts, the Statute of Frauds^
Lawrence vs. Chase, 54 Me. 196.
Boston Duck Co. vs. Dewey, 6 Gray, 446.
The common law is the other way, that the statute of frauds can 
be shown under the general issue, but in these two states it is held 
that it must be pleaded specially.
There is a dictum in the case of Clark vs. Holway, 101 Me. 391, 
to the effect, by implication at least, that payment cannot be shown 
under the general issue.
The general issue in debt on a simple contract is nil debet.
As to what can be shown under this plea, the same rule that I 
have given you under non assumpsit applies. Some authorities hold 
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that the statute of limitations can be set up under the general issue, 
but it is very doubtful.
The general issue in debt on a specialty is non est factum. —
Under this plea the defendant may show:
eLzJlrda^
1. That he never executed the deed.
2. That it is absolutely void in law.
3. That there has been a material alteration by a party thereto; 
or, if he declares on it in its altered condition, by a stranger.
Nil debet is not a good plea to debt on a bond or specialty, the 
reason being that you cannot say to an action on a specialty that 
you do not owe, for the seal imports a consideration. The plea is 
therefore bad on demurrer.
But if the plaintiff joins in a plea of nil debet instead of demurring, 
defendant may prove anything under this that he could under the 
same plea in debt on a simple contract.
Miller vs. Moses, 56 Me. 128.
The general issue to debt on a foreign judgment is nil debet.
By foreign judgment as here used, I mean a judgment of a 
foreign country, and not a judgment of a sister state.
The general issue to debt on a domestic judgment is nul tiel 
record.
Under the plea of nul tiel record, the existence of the record only 
is in issue. Under this plea, all you can show is that no such record 
or judgment exists.
Tourigney vs. Hoole, 88 Me. 406.
The general issue in debt on a penal statute is ml debet or not 
guilty.
1 Chitty on Pleading, 481.
Burnham vs. Webster, 5 Mass. 266.
1 Term Reports, 462; s. c. 99 Engl. Reprint, 1198.
The general issue in covenant broken is non est factum.
As to what may be shown under this plea, the same rule applies 
as to debt on a specialty.
The general issue in trespass is not guilty.
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—Under this plea, defendant may show that he did not commit the 
act described, and, in trespass de bonis, that the goods did not belong 
to the plaintiff, and, in trespass quare clausum, that the close was not 
the plaintiff’s.
The general issue in trespass on the case is not guilty.
Under this plea the same rule as given for non assumpsit applies 
with few exceptions.
One is, that truth in slander and libel must be pleaded specially.
The general issue in trover is not guilty.
Under this plea the defendant can set up anything in defense 
except a release, which is said to be the only special plea in bar to an 
action of trover, all others amounting to the general issue.
The general issue in detinue is non detinet.
Under this, defendant may show either that he did not detain the 
goods or that they did not belong to the plaintiff. . ZcTEl tX
The general issue in replevin is non_cepit. -
Under this, the defendant may show that he did not take the 
plaintiff’s goods or, it being a local action, that he did not take them 
at the plate mentioned.
If the defendant claims title to the goods replevied, he must set 
it up under a brief statement or by a special plea, for the general 
issue pleaded alone admits the title to be in the plaintiff.
See Replevin under The Declaration.
Conclusion of Pleas of the General Issue*
When any matter not of record is denied by the general issue, the 
plea, if the case is before a jury, concludes “to the country,” that is, 
the jury.
All issues of fact, if triable by a jury, conclude in the same manner. 
3 Blackstone’s Comm. 315.
Exception.
The general issue in debt on a domestic judgment (nul tiel record) 
is the only one that does not conclude to the country. This, like a 
special plea in bar, concludes with a verification. The issue is then 
closed by the adverse party re-affirming the record and praying that 
it be examined by the court.
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2 Chitty on Pleading, 488.
Stephen on Pleading, 255.
The reason is that a record is considered of too high a nature to be 
tried by a jury or in any other way than by itself, that is, by personal 
inspection by the court.
The form of conclusion of a plea to the country is as follows: “And 
of this, defendant puts himself upon the country”; or, if it is a denial 
on the part of the plaintiff, “This the plaintiff prays may be inquired 
of by the country.”
3 Blackstone’s Comm. 313.
If in a court without a jury, the conclusion is, “and of this, de­
fendant puts himself upon trial.”
In a plea of the general issue, the plaintiff must join and this is 
done by the plaintiff’s adding below the defendant’s plea the words, 
“and the plaintiff likewise,” or “and the plaintiff doth the like,” 
meaning of course that plaintiff also refers the case to the country, 
or the court, as the case may be.
This addition is known in pleading as the similiter.
3 Blackstone’s Comm. 315.
VIII. DEMURRERS.
r /dv
To demur is to rest or pause and he who demurs to his adversary’s 
pleading rests or pauses upon it as requiring no answer because it is 
insufficient in law.
3 Blackstone’s Comm. 314.
A demurrer is not strictly a plea since it neither asserts nor denies 
any fact but raises a question of law as to the sufficiency of the 
previous pleading.
Either party may demur to any stage of the pleading on either 
side before an issue is reached and his opponent must join in the 
demurrer.
Coke on Littleton, 72.
A demurrer once filed and joined cannot be withdrawn without 
leave of the court and the adverse party.
Me. R. S. Chap. 84, Sect. 35.
A demurrer admits all facts well pleaded to be true, but only such 
facts.
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Formerly, by the common law of England, a demurrer only ad­
mitted the truth of facts well pleaded both in substance and in form, 
and a general demurrer reached defects in form as well as in sub­
stance. There was no such thing as a special demurrer.
But by the statute of XXVII Elizabeth, Chapter V, Section 1, it 
was provided that all defects and imperfections merely formal were 
aided on demurrer and might be amended by the court, except such as 
were expressly and specifically set down and assigned as a cause of 
demurrer.
Bacon’s Abridgment, Pleas, N. 6.
This statute gave rise to two kinds of demurrers which now exist, 
general and special.
A general demurrer is one not specially assigning any cause for 
demurrer but which simply asserts in general terms that the pleading 
demurred to is insufficient in law.
Two important requisites of all good pleading are that the matter 
pleaded be sufficient in substance and that it be pleaded according 
to the forms of law.
If the first requisite be lacking, it is a defect that can be taken 
advantage of by a general demurrer.
But if the matter itself is sufficient, and the only defect be in the 
form of the pleading, it can only be taken advantage of by a special 
demurrer.
An example of a defect in substance is the failure to allege a con­
sideration in an action on a simple contract, or the performance of a 
condition precedent.
An example of a defect in form is a special plea in bar amounting 
to the general issue, or double pleading, or argumentative pleading.
Bacon’s Abridgment, Pleas N. 5 and 6.
Ryan vs. Watson, 2 Me. 382.
Briggs vs. G. T. R. R. Co., 54 Me. 375.
It is the general rule that defects in substance, and those only, 
can be taken advantage of by a general demurrer.
There are two exceptions to this rule:
Exception I.
Formal defects in dilatory pleas.
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Exception II.
Formal defects in indictments and other criminal processes.
The statute of XXVII Elizabeth (which was later supplemented 
by the statutes of IV and V Anne, which specified that certain defects 
in substance should be considered defects in form) did not extend to 
criminal proceedings or to dilatory pleas, the words of both statutes 
being, “any action or suit.”
As the statute of XXVII Elizabeth expressly excluded from its 
operation criminal proceedings, it of course did not apply to in­
dictments, and the object of the statute being expressed to be in 
furtherance of justice, and dilatory pleas not being favored in the 
law, the latter were held not to be within the spirit of the statute.
So, as regards criminal proceedings and dilatory pleas, the law in 
force prior to the statute of XXVII Elizabeth prevails, and therefore 
a general demurrer to a dilatory plea or to an indictment reaches all 
defects in form as well as in substance.
Severy vs. Nye, 58 Me. 246.
Bellamy vs. Oliver, 65 Me. 108. 
State vs. Dresser, 54 Me. 569.
The usual form of a general demurrer is, “And now the defendant 
comes, etc., when etc., and says that the plaintiff’s declaration is 
insufficient in law, wherefore he prays judgment and for his costs.”
All matter, though sufficient in substance, must be pleaded accord­
ing to the forms of law or the pleading will be defective. How 
formal defects in the pleading can be taken advantage of brings us 
to the consideration of special demurrers.
A special demurrer is one which denies the legal sufficiency of the 
previous pleading in certain matters of form specially assigned and 
pointed out by the demurrer.
It also reaches defects in substance, whether they are specially 
assigned as causes of demurrer or not.
Scott vs. Whipple, 6 Greenleaf, 425.
If the defect is one of form, it can be taken advantage of by special 
demurrer only, with the exception, stated above, of dilatory pleas 
and criminal proceedings.
Neal vs. Hanson, 60 Me. 84.
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If the defect is one of substance, it can be taken advantage of either 
by a general or a special demurrer.
Scott vs. Whipple, 6 Greenleaf, 425.
A special demurrer to reach a defect in form must point out 
specifically wherein the previous pleading is defective.
It is not sufficient to allege in general terms that the previous 
pleading is double, informal, or argumentative. You must go further 
and point out exactly wherein it is double, informal, or argumentative.
Briggs vs. G. T. R. R. Co., 54 Me. 375.
Ryan vs. Watson, 2 Me. 382.
There cannot be a demurrer to a demurrer. If one party demurs, 
the adverse party must join, even though the demurrer be informal.
Wakefield vs. Littlefield, 52 Me. 21.
Bacon’s Abridgment, Pleas, N. 2.
Failure to join in a demurrer works a discontinuance.
Heard on Pleading, 57.
There are two things of supreme importance which you must 
consider before you file a demurrer.
First, all facts well pleaded are admitted to be true,
Facts ill pleaded are not admitted. Therefore an allegation in 
consistent with a prior allegation of the same party, allegations of 
facts which are not material or legally impossible, facts of which 
the court will take judicial notice, and matters of law, are never ad­
mitted by a demurrer.
Jones vs. Dow, 137 Mass. 119.
Second, a demurrer opens the entire record and judgment will be 
given against the party making the first error of substance from the 
declaration down.
If a declaration is defective in substance and the defendant’s plea 
is also defective, and the plaintiff demurs to the plea, notwithstanding 
that the plea is defective, judgment will be given to the defendant, 
for the plaintiff made the first error of substance, and a defective 
plea is a good answer to a defective declaration.
So if the declaration is good but the plea and the replication are 
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defective, and the defendant demurs to the replication, judgment 
will be entered for the plaintiff, for defendant made the first error of 
substance.
Shelden vs. Call, 55 Me. 159.
Calais vs. Bradford, 51 Me. 414.
Stilphen vs. Stilphen, 58 Me. 508.
Poor vs. R. R. Co., 59 Me. 270.
State vs. Sweetsir, 53 Me. 438.
Rule applies to general demurrers only.
Bell vs. Lamprey, 52 N. H. 49.
There are four exceptions to the rule that a demurrer opens the 
entire record.
Exception I.
A demurrer to a dilatory plea does not reach back.
For example, if plaintiff demurs to a plea in abatement, and the 
court decides against the plea, they will give judgment of respondeat 
ouster without regard to the defects, if there are any, in the declara­
tion.
1 Saunders’ Reports, 285; 85 Engl. Reprint, 370.
Heard on Pleading, 109.
Ryan vs. May, 14 Ill. 49.
Ellis vs. Ellis, 4 R. I. 110.
Clifford vs. Cony, 1 Mass., 500.
Bent vs. Bent, 43 Vt. 42.
Exception II.
Although upon the whole record the right may appear to be with 
the plaintiff, yet the court will not give judgment for such right, un­
less the plaintiff has himself put his action upon that ground.
Marsh vs. Bulteel, 5B. & A. 507; s. c. 106 Engl. Reprint, 1276. 
Head vs. Baldrey, 6 Ad. & El. 459; s. c. 112 Engl. Reprint, 175.
For example, in an action to perform an award, and not, to prevent 
the arbitrators from making an award, plaintiff declared in covenant, 
and assigned as a breach that the defendant would not pay the sum 
awarded; defendant pleaded that, before the award was made, he 
revoked by deed the authority of the arbitrators, to which plea the 
plaintiff demurred.
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The court held the plea good as being a sufficient answer to the 
breach alleged and gave judgment for the defendant, although they 
were also of the opinion that the matter stated in the plea would 
have entitled plaintiff to recover if he had alleged by way of breach 
that defendant had prevented the arbitrators from making the award. 
Exception III.
When the replication to a defective plea is not only insufficient in 
substance, but also shows that the plaintiff has no cause of action, 
although the declaration is good.
For example, if, in an action on a penal bond, defendant pleads an 
insufficient bar, and plaintiff in his replication assigns as a breach 
what is in law no breach, the judgment on a demurrer to the replica­
tion would be for the defendant although his plea is defective in 
substance, for it appears from the whole record that the plaintiff is 
not entitled to recover.
Gould on Pleading, 5th Ed. 443.
Shaw vs. Peckett, 25 Vt. 423.
Exception IV.
If the demurrer to the declaration is “too large” as it is called, that 
is, if, to a declaration containing two counts, defendant, instead of 
confining his demurrer to the count which is defective, demurs to 
the whole declaration, judgment will be given to the plaintiff; for, if 
a demurrer is filed to a declaration one count of which is good, it will 
be overruled.
Blanchard vs. Hoxie, 34 Me. 376.
In Maine, if a demurrer is filed at the first term and overruled, the 
defendant may plead anew on payment of costs from the time it is 
filed, unless it is adjudged frivolous and intended for delay, in which 
case judgment shall be entered.
Me. R. S., Chap. 84, Sect. 35.
IX* SOME RULES OF PLEADING
Rule I.
After the declaration, the parties must either demur or plead to 
the declaration by way of traverse or confession and avoidance.
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Rule 11.
Upon a traverse, issue must be tendered.
Weltale vs. Glover, 10 Modern, 166; s. c. 88 Engl. Reprint, 677. 
Hartwell vs. Hemmenway, 7 Pick, 116.
Rule 111.
An issue either of law cr fact, if well tendered, must be accepted. 
If the issue is well tendered both in substance and form, it must be 
accepted and the adverse party can neither demur, traverse, nor 
plead in confession and avoidance.
Dawes vs. W inship, 16 Mass. 290.
Hapgood vs. Houghton, 8 Pick. 451. 
Earle vs. Hall, 22 Pick. 102.
Rule IV.
The pleading must not be double at common law.
This applies to all stages of the pleadings. The declaration must 
not, in support of a single demand, allege several matters by any one 
of which the demand may be proved.
With reference to the later stages of the pleadings, the rule means 
that two distinct matters, either of which if taken by itself would be 
a sufficient answer to the previous pleading, should not be contained 
in the same plea.
Ferguson vs. Meredith, 1 Wall. 26.
R. I. vs. Mass., 14 Peters, 210, 259. 
Lord vs. Tyler, 14 Pick. 156.
A pleading will be double if it contains several answers whatever 
may be their quality, that is, containing several matters in bar or 
in abatement, or containing several matters in confession and avoid­
ance, or containing a traverse with a matter in confession and avoid­
ance.
Stephen on Pleading, 316.
Duplicity is an error in form and can be taken advantage of by a 
special demurrer only.
Kipp vs. Bell, 86 Ill. 577.
Double pleas are allowed in Maine by statute 
"MeR. S. Uhap. 84, Sect. 34.
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Rule V.
A party cannot both plead and demur to the same matter.
By this is meant, that you cannot both plead and demur to the 
same count at the same time, but at common law you can plead to 
one count and demur to another in the same declaration.
Heard on Pleading, 208.
Rule VI.
It is not necessary or proper to state in the pleadings that which is 
merely evidence. Facts only should be stated.
Williams vs. Wilcox, 8 Ad. & El. 331; s. c. 112 Engl. Re­
print, 863.
Watriss vs. Pierce, 36 N. H. 232.
Smith vs. Wiggin, 51 N. H. 156.
Rule VII.
It is not necessary to allege the existence of facts of which the 
courts will take judicial notice.
1 Blackstone’s Comm. 85.
Coke on Littleton, 303 b.
Shipman on Pleading, 426.
Rule VIII.
It is not necessary to allege presumptions of law.
Williams vs. E. India Co., 3 East, 192; s. c. 102 Engl. Re­
print, 571.
For example, in an action for imputing theft, plaintiff need not 
allege that he is not a thief, the reason being that every man is pre­
sumed to be honest until the contrary is proved.
Heard on Pleading, 255.
Rule IX.
Pleadings must not be argumentative.
This is an error in form and can be taken advantage of by a special 
demurrer only.
Pendleton vs. Amy, 13 Wall. 297.
Hodgson vs. E. India Co. 8 Term Reports, 278; s. c. 101 Engl. 
Reprint, 1389.
For example, if a party should allege that A was dead and in your 
reply you should allege that he was alive, your reply would be bad 
on special demurrer because it would be argumentative. The proper 
plea is that A is not dead.
Rule X.
Things are to be pleaded according to their legal effect or operation. 
Bean vs. Ayers, 67 Me. 482.
Howell vs. Richards, 11 East, 633; s. c. 103 Engl. Reprint, 1150.
Commercial Bank vs. French, 20 Pick. 489.
Rule XI.
When a plea amounts to the general issue, it should be so pleaded. 
Thayer vs. Brewer, 15 Pick. 217.
For example, in trespass for entering the plaintiff’s garden, de­
fendant pleaded that plaintiff had no such garden, and the plea was 
held to be bad, as it amounted to the general issue, not guilty.
Heard on Pleading, 304. 
Merritt vs. Miller, 13 Vt. 416.
X. STEPS TO BE TAKEN AFTER VERDICT.
After verdict, but before entry of judgment, the unsuccessful party 
may take certain steps, which are:
1. Motion for a new trial.
2. Exceptions.
3. Motion in arrest of judgment.
4. Repleader.
5. Judgment non obstante veredicto.
L MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
In Maine, in civil cases, a motion for a new trial can be addressed 
either to the law court or to the presiding justice; you must, however, 
elect which course you will pursue, for you cannot file a motion to the 
presiding justice and, if unsuccessful, then file another to the law 
court. If you file a motion to the presiding justice, his decision is final.
In practice, if the motion is addressed to the presiding justice, it is 
not necessary to present a copy of the evidence.
There is one thing important to remember. A presiding justice 
cannot set aside a second verdict in the same party’s favor.
Me. R. S. Chap. 84, Sect. 54.
If the motion is addressed to the law court, it must be sustained 
by a copy of the full evidence submitted to the jury.
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Rule of Court XVII, 103 Me.
Rogers vs. R. R. Co., 38 Me. 227.
Nutt vs. Merrill, 40 Me. 237.
Lakeman vs. Pollard, 43 Me. 463.
In criminal cases, a motion for a new trial must be addressed to 
the presiding justice, for the law court has no jurisdiction over such 
a motion.
Exception.
Where the punishment may be imprisonment for life, if the de­
cision of the presiding justice is unfavorable to the respondent, he 
can appeal to the full bench and the favorable decision of three of 
the eight judges is sufficient to give him a new trial. This is the 
law in this state by statute.
Me. R. S. Chap. 135, Sect. 27.
State vs. Hill, 48 Me. 241.
State vs. Smith, 54 Me. 33.
See further Chapter 184 of the Public Laws of 1909.
The usual grounds on which a motion for a new trial is based are,
a. That the verdict is against the law.
b. That the verdict is against the evidence.
c. That the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
d. That the damages are excessive or inadequate.
Or
e. Newly discovered evidence.
The grounds usually relied on in practice are that the verdict is 
against the evidence, that the damages are excessive, or newly dis­
covered evidence.
The court will not set aside the verdict as against the evidence 
unless it appears that the jury acted under the influence of some 
passion, bias, or prejudice, or misapprehended the evidence or issue.
Glidden vs. Dunlap, 28 Me. 379.
Purinton vs. M. C. R. R. Co., 78 Me. 569.
The court will not grant a new trial unless the verdict is manifestly 
against the evidence, even though the court would have rendered a 
contrary verdict had the evidence been submitted to it instead of to 
the jury.
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Googins vs. Gilmore, 47 Me. 9. 
Williams vs. Bilker, 49 Me. 427.
If the ground for the motion is that the damages are excessive, 
the court may say, “Remit all over a certain sum or a new trial will 
be granted.”
A new trial will sometimes be granted when the damages are too 
small, that is, when they are inadequate.
Powell vs. Haines, Maine Supreme Court, 1899.
(Not reported.)
The disqualification of a juror is a good ground for setting aside a 
verdict providing the party objecting did not know of the disqualifica­
tion until after the trial had commenced.
If he knew of it before the trial and did not object, he will be con­
sidered as having waived the objection.
His motion should negative knowledge; that is, he should state in 
his motion that he did not know of the disqualification until after 
the trial had commenced.
Dolloff vs. Stimpson, 33 Me. 546.
Jameson vs. R. R. Co., 52 Me. 412. 
Tilton vs. Kimball, 52 Me. 500.
A new trial will be granted when material and not cumulative 
evidence, the existence of which was not known to the party making 
the motion, is discovered after verdict.
Warren vs. Hope, 6 Me. 479..
A new trial will not be granted when the evidence claimed to be 
newly discovered might have been ascertained before trial by the 
use of proper diligence.
Falmouth vs. Windham, 63 Me. 44.
Hunter vs. Randall, 69 Me. 183.
Nor unless it appears that injustice has been done.
Woods vs. Jordan, 62 Me. 490.
A motion of this kind should state what the verdict was, the nature 
and grounds of the action against the defendant, and what the newly 
discovered evidence is.
Bartlett vs. Lewis, 58 Me. 350.
For other grounds, see Me. R. S. Chap. 84, Sect. 104.
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2. EXCEPTIONS.
The proper way to take advantage of errors of the court in matters 
of law, either a wrong ruling on the admissibility of evidence or a 
misstatement of the law in his charge, is by a bill of exceptions.
Exceptions to the admissibility of evidence must be taken and a 
note thereof made by the presiding justice at the time the ruling is 
made or all objection is waived.
Exceptions to any opinion, direction, or omission of the presiding 
justice in his charge must be taken before the jury retire or all ob­
jection is waived.
Rule of Court XVIII, 103 Me.
Exceptions do not lie to the decision of the court on matters within 
its discretion.
As, for example, the refusal to grant a non-suit, or to allow an 
attorney to read decisions to the jury.
Ricker vs. Joy, 72 Me. 106.
Moody vs. Hinkley, 34 Me. 200.
Crosby vs. M. C. R. R. Co., 69 Me. 418.
Exceptions do not lie to the decisions of the court on any matter 
of fact.
Clement vs. Foster, 69 Me. 318.
To sustain objections and exceptions, it must not only clearly and 
affirmatively appear that the ruling was wrong but also that the 
party excepting was prejudiced thereby.
Soule vs. Winslow, 66 Me. 447.
State vs. Pike, 65 Me. 111.
Reed vs. Reed, 70 Me. 504.
Exceptions cannot be taken by the party in whose favor the in­
struction was given.
Rice vs. Wallace, 30 Me. 252.
It is no ground for exception that the court referred a question of 
law to the jury, provided that they decided it correctly.
Osgood vs. Lansil, 33 Me. 360.
Webb vs. P. & K. R. R. Co., 57 Me. 117.
It is a good ground for exception that the judge during trial, in­
cluding his charge, expressed an opinion upon issues of fact arising 
in the case, but the judge may comment upon the testimony.
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Me. R. S. Chap. 84, Sect. 97.
State vs. Reid, 62 Me. 129.
Exceptions will not lie to the omission of the court to give instruc­
tions unless requested.
Gardner vs. Gooch, 48 Me. 487.
If a judge inadvertently misstates a fact in the evidence, counsel 
should call his attention to it at the time in order that it may be 
corrected or he waives exception thereto.
Grows vs. M. C. R. R. Co., 69 Me. 412.
A bill of exceptions should state enough of the case to enable the 
court to tell whether the ruling excepted to was erroneous and 
whether the party excepting was injured.
Holbrook vs. Knight, 67 Me. 244.
Pullen vs. Glidden, 68 Me. 559.
For example, where the exception merely set forth the rejection 
or admission of the evidence, without stating the ground, the ex­
ceptions will be overruled.
Comstock vs. Smith, 23 Me. 202.
An exception to the whole charge or to the most of it will not be 
sustained unless all the legal propositions therein are erroneous. 
Bacheller vs. Pinkham, 68 Me. 253.
Macintosh vs. Bartlett, 67 Me. 130.
You must in your bill of exceptions point out exactly that part of 
the charge to which you object.
An exception to “that part of the charge which connects the 
trustees of the M. E. Church of Freeport with the cause at bar” is 
too general when the trustees are mentioned on eight of the eleven 
pages of the charge.
Brackett vs. Brewer, 71 Me. 478.
For other bills of exceptions held too general, see
Crosby vs. M. C. R. R. Co., 69 Me. 418.
Webber vs. Dunn, 71 Me. 331.
State vs. Savage, 69 Me. 112.
Hunter vs. Randall, 69 Me. 183.
You should be very careful in making your bill of exceptions as 
the court can act on them only as they are made up and allowed at 
nisi prius.
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Hunter vs. Heath, 76 Me. 219.
A point not covered by the bill of exceptions cannot be raised in 
argument before the law court.
Harwood vs. Siphers, 70 Me. 464.
3. MOTION IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT.
To such a motion there are three essentials:
a. The grounds on which it is based must be specifically stated. 
State vs. Wing, 32 Me. 581.
Hamilton vs. Pease, 38 Conn. 120.
b. It must be an error in substance and not one which is cured by 
a verdict.
Slack vs. Lyon, 9 Pick. 62.
Sawyer vs. Boston, 144 Mass. 470. 
Read vs. Chelmsford, 16 Pick. 128.
It is a rule that no defects in the pleadings which would not have 
been fatal on a general demurrer can be reached by a motion in arrest 
of judgment.
3 Blackstone’s Comm. 394.
c. The error must appear on the face of the record.
Sewall Falls Bridge vs. Fisk, 23 N. H. 171.
State vs. Carver, 49 Me. 588.
Motions in arrest of judgment in civil actions have been abolished 
in Maine by statute.
Me. R. S. Chap. 84, Sect. 46.
Stetson vs. Corinna, 44 Me. 29.
4. REPLEADER.
A motion for a repleader is made upon the single ground of the 
immateriality of the issue upon which judgment was rendered.
Gerrish vs. Train, 3 Pick. 124.
Potter vs. Titcomb, 7 Me. 302.
Com. Dig., Pleader, R. 18.
Whether this motion can be made by the party raising the im­
material issue is a question. There are cases both ways.
In Maine, it is probably a matter within the discretion of the court. 
Strout vs. Durham, 23 Me. 483.
Ham vs. Ham, 37 Me. 261.
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5. JUDGMENT NON OBSTANTE VEREDICTO.
This motion is made by the plaintiff after a verdict against him, 
the plea of the defendant having been by confession and avoidance 
and the matter of avoidance being bad in law, so that the plaintiff’s 
cause stands confessed. The plaintiff asks for judgment, the verdict 
notwithstanding.
Dewey vs. Humphrey, 5 Pick. 187.
Lambert vs. Taylor, 4 B. & C. 138; s. c. 107 Engl. Reprint, 
1014.
Buckley vs. Duff, 111 Pa. St. 223; s. c. 3 Atl. 823.
This motion is never made by the defendant.
Smith vs. Powers, 15 N. H. 546.
Sometimes when the Verdict is in plaintiff’s favor, he may fear to 
take judgment on account of some irregularity in the pleading and 
may then make this motion for a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict.
XI. PECULIARITIES AND INCIDENTS OF PLEADING.
THE PLEA OF PUIS DARREIN CONTINUANCE.
It is a general rule of the common law that any matter of defense 
arising after the commencement of the suit cannot be pleaded in bar 
to the suit.
If such matter arises before the plea or demurrer of the defendant 
is filed, it must be pleaded to the further maintenance of the action.
Rowell vs. Hayden, 40 Me. 582.
If such matter arises after the plea is filed or even after issue is 
joined, but before verdict, then it must be pleaded puis darrein 
continuance.
This is a plea by the defendant of such matters of defence as have 
arisen since the last continuance. It may be pleaded in abatement 
or in bar according as the subject matter of it is in abatement or in 
bar.
The effect of such a plea is that all the former pleas are superseded 
and everything is confessed except the matter raised by the plea.
Such pleas are not favored and the greatest care must be exer­
cised in pleading them.
Hilliker vs. Simpson, 92 Me. 590.
Augusta vs. Moulton, 75 Me. 551.
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It is not sufficient to state that the matter arose since the last 
continuance; it is necessary to state the precise day on which the 
matter arose which constitutes the defense.
Cummings vs. Smith, 50 Me. 568.
It is also necessary to state the day of the last continuance, other­
wise the plea will be bad on demurrer.
Poland vs. Davis, 103 Me. 55.
Augusta vs. Moulton, supra.
The plea should be filed at the next term after the matter of de­
fense arose and the defendant has no right to file it at any other time. 
It is however within the discretion of the court to allow him to do so, 
and as a matter of practice, it will be allowed if the justice of the case 
seems to require it.
The way to take advantage of the failure to seasonably file the plea 
is not by demurrer but by a motion to dismiss the plea.
Rowell vs. Hayden, 40 Me. 582.
The judgment on a demurrer to a defective plea of this kind is final. 
McKeen vs. Parker, 51 Me. 389.
The court has the power to award a repleader in the cause of justice, 
but it is within its discretion and no exception will lie to its ruling.
Cummings vs. Smith, 50 Me. 568.
It cannot be pleaded after verdict.
State vs. Peck, 60 Me. 498.
NEW ASSIGNMENTS.
A new assignment is a restatement by the plaintiff in his replica­
tion of his cause of action.
Where the declaration is ambiguous and the defendant pleads facts 
which are literally an answer to it, but which do not answer the real 
claim set up by the plaintiff, he should reply with a new assignment, 
setting up with greater clearness the particular cause of action relied 
upon.
1 Saunders’ Reports, 299 a, note 6; 85 Engl. Reprint, 408. 
Barnes vs. Hunt, 11 East, 451; s. c. 103 Engl. Reprint, 1078. 
Taylor vs. Smith, 7 Taunton, 156; s. c. 129 Engl. Reprint, 62. 
Spencer vs. Bemis, 46 Vt. 29.
Hannen vs. Edes, 15 Mass. 347.
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For a form of replication setting forth a new assignment, see 
Shipman on Pleading, Form 38, page 526.
XII. STEPS TO BE TAKEN AFTER JUDGMENT.
1. Audita querela.
2. Certiorari.
3. Writ of review.
4. Writ of error.
L AUDITA QUERELA.
This writ is a remedial process to relieve a party who has been in­
jured or who is in danger of being injured from the consequences of a 
judgment because of some improper action of the party who obtained 
it which could not have been pleaded in bar to the action.
It is in the nature of a bill in equity to obtain relief against 
oppression or the danger of oppression, and that danger is necessary 
to maintain the action.
Bryant vs. Johnson, 24 Me. 304.
3 Blackstone’s Comm. 405.
It relates to the wrongful acts of the adverse party only and not 
to the errors of the court.
School Dist. vs. Rood, 27 Vt. 214.
This writ is seldom used. The form of the writ and the proceed­
ings can be found in chapter 102 of the Revised Statutes.
2. CERTIORARI.
This is a writ issued by the Supreme Judicial Court addressed to 
an inferior court commanding it to certify and return its records.
It is the regular process under which errors in the proceedings of 
inferior courts from which there is no appeal can be examined and 
corrected.
Dow vs. True, 19 Me. 46.
It is only to correct errors of law, and where the record contains 
no error, the writ cannot be issued.
Levant vs. Co. Commrs., 67 Me. 429.
Writs of certiorari are granted only at the discretion of the court, 
but this is a legal discretion and must be exercised under rules of law.
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Cushing vs. Gay, 23 Me. 9.
A writ of certiorari will not be granted to correct simply errors of 
form which do not affect the merits of the case, nor on account of 
mere technical objections to the record when substantial justice does 
not require it.
Lewiston vs. Co. Commrs., 30 Me. 19.
Waterville, etc., 31 Me. 506.
Fairfield vs. Co. Commrs., 66 Me. 385.
Furbush vs. Cunningham, 56 Me. 184.
A writ of certiorari lies,
First, in all proceedings of the city council in relation to ways, act­
ing under a charter which gives to that body exclusive power to lay 
out, repair, or alter ways.
Baldwin vs. Bangor, 36 Me. 518.
Gay vs. Bradstreet, 49 Me. 580. 
Preble vs. Portland, 45 Me. 241.
Second, in all proceedings before the county commissioners in lay­
ing out highways.
Goodwin vs. Hallowell, 12 Me. 271.
White vs. Co. Commrs., 70 Me. 317.
Commonwealth vs. Coombs, 2 Mass. 489.
Third, in all proceedings before commissioners in setting off land 
under petitions for partition.
Dyer vs. Lowell, 30 Me. 217.
Fourth, on the complaints against the putative father of a bastard 
child.
Drowne vs. Stimpson, 2 Mass. 441.
Gile vs. Moore, 2 Pick. 386.
The judgment on a petition of certiorari is simply that the writ 
be granted or denied.
The granting of the writ does not quash the proceedings complained 
of. They remain valid until quashed by a judgment on the writ.
State vs. Madison, 63 Me. 546.
The hearing on a writ of certiorari must be before the full court. 
A new assignment of errors is not necessary.
Commonwealth vs. Sheldon, 3 Mass. 188.
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The judgment on a writ of certiorari is that the proceedings of the 
inferior court be affirmed or quashed.
No new judgment can be rendered.
Commonwealth vs. Ellis, 11 Mass. 462.
A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only if made 
within six years next after the proceedings complained of.
Me. R. S. Chap. 104, Sect. 16.
3. WRIT OF REVIEW.
This is a statutory method, unknown to the comman law, of re­
trying the case where it is made to appear that through fraud, 
accident, mistake, or misfortune, justice has not been done, and that 
a new trial would be equitable.
Wilbur vs. Dyer, 39 Me. 169.
By statute, in Maine, the Supreme Judicial Court held by one justice 
may grant one review in civil actions, including petitions for par­
tition, and for certiorari, and proceedings for the location of lands re­
served for public uses, when judgment has been rendered in any tri­
bunal, and a petition therefor has been presented within three years. 
Me. R. S. Chap. 91, Sect. 1.
The special cases in which a review may be granted are found in 
section 1 of chapter 91 of the Revised Statutes.
In all cases there enumerated, the defendant is not entitled to a 
review as a matter of right, but only in the discretion of the court.
In certain cases, the defendant does not have to appeal to the dis­
cretion of the court, but is entitled to a review as a matter of right.
When a judgment is rendered on default of an absent defendant, 
who, being an inhabitant of the state, had no actual notice of the 
suit, or who was not an inhabitant of the state, he is entitled of right 
to a review of the judgment if action therefor is brought within one 
year.
Me. R. S. Chap. 84, Sects. 3 and 4.
Davis vs. Stevens, 57 Me. 593.
When entitled to a writ of review as a' matter of right, it is un­
necessary to petition therefor.
Jackson vs. Gould, 72 Me. 335.
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4. WRIT OF ERROR.
A writ of error is an original writ, in the nature of a commission to 
the judges of the court from which it issues, authorizing and requiring 
them to examine the grounds upon which a judgment, either in their 
own or in an inferior court, was given, in the same case specified in 
the writ, and to determine whether said judgment should be altered, 
reversed, or affirmed.
In Maine, a writ of error is issued from and is returnable to the 
Supreme Judicial Court only.
It can issue in term time or in vacation.
Me. R. S. Chap. 104, Sect. 1.
Certain Requisites.
a. The error must be one of substance and not one aided by 
verdict, or amendable by common law or statute.
Piper vs. Goodwin, 23 Me. 251.
b. The plaintiff must be aggrieved by the error complained of. 
Shirley vs. Lunenburg, 11 Mass. 379.
Whiting vs. Cochran, 9 Mass. 532.
c. It lies only to reverse a final as distinguished from an inter­
locutory judgment.
Butterfield vs. Briggs, 92 Me. 49.
d. It lies only to reverse judgments of courts of record acting 
according to the course of the common law.
Commonwealth vs. Ellis, 11 Mass. 466.
e. It must be a judgment from which the aggrieved party at the 
time of bringing the writ has no means or right of appeal, and it 
should appear that this right has not been lost through his negligence.
Savage vs. Gulliver, 4 Mass. 171.
Howard vs. Hill, 31 Me. 420.
f. That the aggrieved party has no remedy by writ of review.
Dennison vs. Portland Co., 60 Me. 519.
g. That the aggrieved party has no remedy by a bill of exceptions. 
Howard vs. Hill, 31 Me. 420.
In general terms, the object of a writ of error is to obtain a re­
versal or correction of a judgment, either by reason of some error in
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fact affecting the validity and regularity of the legal decision itself, 
or on account of some mistake or error in law, apparent upon the 
face of the record, from which the judgment appears to be incorrect 
or rendered in favor of the wrong party.
The form of the writ and the proceedings thereon are prescribed 
by statute in Maine.
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